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Perhaps everything related to the attack on September 11th and the
response to it is so unprecedented that it makes no sense to use pre-
existing frameworks to examine either the attack itself or its after-
math. Nonetheless, we can only come to terms with September 11th
using the tools that we have, many of which involve drawing on past
experience as a basis for prediction and comparison. Moreover, the
social, legal, and political response to September 11th is rooted in per-
ceptions, belief systems, and institutions formed long before the
events of that day. Thus, principles and categories developed before
September 11th have shaped the response to the attack even as they
have been changed by it. With the passage of time, it is easier to see
that the reservoir of human experience has a depth and breadth that
renders few phenomena truly without parallel. For all of these rea-
sons, the urge to look at even the unique aspects of September 11th in
light of pre-September 11th categories and principles is extremely
powerful.
Just ten days after September 11, 2001, Congress established the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund), which
permits the families of victims to receive full financial compensation
for their losses through application to a fund established and adminis-
tered by the federal government.' One can look at the Fund as an
example of how things relating to September 11th depart from previ-
ously accepted norms.2 The Fund relies on distributive principles that
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. I am grateful to Bruce Green, Katherine Kennedy,
Russell Pearce and Benjamin Zipursky for comments on drafts of this paper, and to Beirong
Rebecca Lu for her help in research.
1. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (codified as 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West 2003))[hereinafter Transportation Safety
Act] The legislation, however, requires that certain collateral sources be deducted from the final
award. Id.
2. See Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92 (stating that
"nothing in the history of the country is comparable to the system of compensation set in place"
for victims of September llth); September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed.
Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (referring to the Fund as a "unique federal program").
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are unlike any other government benefit program. While other gov-
ernment programs provide death benefits or pensions to survivors,
none attempt the goal of "compensation" in the sense of making sur-
vivors financially whole for the resulting loss. 3 Instead, most govern-
ment-awarded death benefits have focused on supporting surviving
dependents or providing compensation in only fixed limited amounts.
The Fund's reliance on the principle of full compensation results in
the payment of awards that are far in excess of other government pro-
grams which provide payments to survivors.4
Although the Fund appears anomalous as a government benefit
program, the basic principles for the provision of awards fit comforta-
bly within the framework of tort law in which compensation for loss of
life is an everyday matter. The connection to tort law is evident in the
legislation. The governing statute provides that award amounts shall
be based on "the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the
individual circumstances of the claimant."'5 It makes clear that both
economic loss and noneconomic harm, such as pain and suffering, are
compensable. 6 Thus, the legislation, like tort law, establishes a broad
principle of compensation and leaves to a fact-finder the difficult
value judgements that are necessarily implicated.
The link to tort law is evident in other ways as well. Individuals
filing claims with the Fund waive their rights to pursue most of the
possible tort remedies that would otherwise have been available to
3. For example, the Social Security system provides a lump sum death benefit of only $255.
Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, 20 C.F.R. § 404.390 (2003). A monthly
pension is available only to surviving spouses when they are caring for minor dependents, or are
themselves above sixty years old or disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (defining eligibility for
spousal benefits); § 402(g) (eligibility for mother's benefits).
Worker's compensation plans are plainly based on a concept of "compensation," however, the
amounts provided are strictly limited, and are not based on an individualized computation of the
victims' pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. See ROBERT KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 867 (3d ed. 1998) ("In general, worker's compensation aims to
provide full recovery of medical and rehabilitation expense, but only limited recovery of wage
loss, and no recovery for pain and suffering as such.").
Payments to survivors of public officials killed on the job are generally very limited. Federal
law provides that family members of public safety officers killed in the line of duty receive a
lump sum of $250,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a) (2000); 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (2000). Relatives of
soldiers killed in action receive a death benefit of $6,000 and a widows' pension of at least
$10,000 a year. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-77 (2000).
4. The administrators of the Fund estimate that awards will average $1.8 million for each
victim before collateral offsets. See CBS News, Terror Attack Compensation Raised, (Mar. 7,
2002), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/07/nationallmain5O3242.shtml (last
visited Dec. 24, 2003).
5. Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
6. The Act defines economic loss in terms of applicable state law, thus incorporating an ex-
plicit reference to allowable categories of harm in tort law. Id. § 402(5).
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them. 7 The waiver provision makes clear that the Fund serves as a
substitute for the tort system. The legislation also caps the potential
liability of the airline industry, in effect limiting the tort remedies
available to victims. 8 The Fund mitigates the negative impact of this
cap by providing victims with an assured means of recovery. 9
The statutory language also suggests that Congress viewed the Fund
from the vantage point of tort law, even where it differs from the tort
system. Thus, the legislation states that awards are not contingent
upon a showing of "negligence or any other theory of liability," an
inclusion that suggests Congress used tort law as its frame of reference
in crafting the statute. The statute provides administration of the pro-
gram by a "special master," an office that generally serves as an ad-
junct to the court in a judicial proceeding. 10 For these reasons, it is
tempting to conceive of the Fund, not as a government benefit pro-
gram analogous to Social Security, but rather as a settlement fund-a
pot of money to be distributed to the victims of a mass tort in satisfac-
tion of their tort claims. The fact that the Fund is limited to the provi-
sion of awards relating to a single series of incidents also invites the
comparison to a discrete tort settlement fund, rather than an ongoing
governmental program.
Viewed this way, the Fund appears less anomalous. By now, there
is a wealth of experience in dealing with large tort compensation
schemes, in the context of class action settlements.1' For a number of
reasons, however, the conception of the Fund as simply another mass
tort claims system is not fully satisfying. There are aspects of the Fund
that appear to differ fundamentally from recovery schemes in prod-
ucts liability litigation or suits such as the Agent Orange litigation in-
volving the exposure of large numbers of individuals to toxic
substances.
First, it is far from clear that the payments reflect the actual or
likely tort liability of entities who are protected from suit, such as the
airlines or the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, because
7. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
8. Id. § 201.
9. Democrats in Congress pushed for the creation of the Fund as a means of providing redress
to those who would otherwise lose out due to the liability cap. See Belkin, supra note 2, at 92.
According to the New York Times, Democrats insisted that "because the plan was a replacement
for the tort system, it should operate like the tort system." Id. at 94.
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (defining powers of special masters in federal litigation).
11. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litiga-
tion: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993) (identifying and discussing distinc-
tive features of mass tort litigation); Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass
Seet.ent of Alass TJrts, 53 LAw & CuNrTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990) (collecting articles on settlements
in mass tort cases).
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for many of the victims of the attack on September 11th, the possibil-
ity of recovery under tort law seems remote. 12 The fact that the vic-
tims of the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing have not successfully recov-
ered in tort are reminders that terrorism victims have not routinely
won judgments against anyone other than the terrorists themselves.
In sum, the liability assumed by the Fund appears disproportionate to
the likely results of litigation.' 3 For this reason, it is difficult to justify
the awards simply based on the potential tort liability of the entities
shielded from suit.
It is, of course, possible to form a different view of the likelihood of
recovery through litigation. Therefore, it is important that the Fund
differs from an ordinary tort compensation scheme in another more
fundamental way-the awards are paid out directly by the United
States Treasury. The expenditure of government funds needs a justifi-
cation beyond the potential tort liability of the airlines and other enti-
ties. The use of direct government funds to compensate victims raises
a set of issues that go beyond the usual principles that underpin tort
awards. Because the government is not the tortfeasor, the question of
why the public should foot the bill for direct transfers of income to
individuals moves to the foreground. 14 Moreover, once the govern-
12. See Lee Kreindler, Pros and Cons of Victims' Fund: Compensation Provisions May Bring
Salvation or Frustration, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 5. Domestic passengers on the four hijacked
flights would have to establish negligence in the airlines security systems, a showing that could
be difficult given that the weapons used by the terrorists were not, at the time, proscribed items.
Id. Victims on the ground would bear the burden of showing negligence and would also face
additional difficulties in establishing that any of the potential defendants should have reasonably
foreseen the risk of harm. Id. Only the international passengers on the four planes have a clear
ground of recovery under the Warsaw Convention, but the Convention has a $75,000 limit on
damages that could be awarded to each victim. See Convention for Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876. See also
Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1265, 1269-71 (2002)
(discussing "tenuous" nature of the tort liability of the airlines and World Trade Center security
personnel).
Despite these difficulties, Judge Alvin Hellerstein recently denied defendants' motion to dis-
miss claims by seventy victims against the airlines, airport security companies and airline manu-
facturers, finding that they did indeed owe a duty to individuals on the ground who could be
injured in an airplane crash resulting from a hijacking. See In Re September 11 Litig., 21-MC-97
(2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15522) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2003). Judge Hellerstein also denied the mo-
tion to dismiss by the owners of the World Trade Center. Id.
13. By way of comparison, none of the litigation filed by victims of the 1993 attack on the
World Trade Center or the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City have received
payments through the lawsuits. See Belkin, supra note 2, at 92; Paul H.B. Shin, 10 Years After
Blast WTC Kin Feel Shaken, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 1993.
14. Over time, information has emerged that lends credence to claims that the government
bears at least some responsibility for its failure to forestall the attack. Thus, in retrospect, it may
be possible to view the Fund as a recognition of this responsibility. See GERALD POSNER, WHY
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ment is providing substantial assistance to individuals, the issues of
equity among recipients and between recipients and others who do
not receive awards become much more pressing. This reliance on gov-
ernment funding has a significant impact on the questions of how
much individual victims should receive and how they should be
treated in relation to each other.
On one level, the explanation for public funding of compensation
for the victims of the September 11th attacks appears easy to iden-
tify-the Fund is part of the government bailout of the airline indus-
try following the disaster. The objective of protecting the airlines is
apparent in the legislative history, which is replete with expressions of
congressional concern about the possible collapse of the air transpor-
tation system in the United States.15 In essence, the Fund is a means
of shielding the airlines and other potential tort defendants from the
avalanche of litigation that would otherwise have followed. The Fund
accomplishes this purpose in two ways. First (and most directly), the
legislation bars claimants to the Fund from bringing suit. Second, the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (Transporta-
tion Safety Act) caps the liability of the airlines at the amount of their
insurance coverage. The Fund makes palatable this measure which
undercuts the ability of potential tort plaintiffs to recover through
litigation.
The goal of protecting the airlines from tort liability provides a con-
nection between the Fund and the tort system that is very direct. Be-
cause the Fund replaces potential tort liability, it makes sense for it to
borrow the compensation principles from tort law. Moreover, be-
cause victims have the choice between litigation and the Fund, the
Fund is, in essence, competing with the tort system.
At the same time, however, an understanding of the Fund that
reduces the victims of the terrorist attacks to the status of mere poten-
tial creditors of the airlines is unsatisfying. The establishment of the
Fund was part of the tremendous outpouring of sympathy and com-
passion for the victims of the terrorist attacks. 16 It was a governmen-
tal expression of the same impulses that led Americans to donate
AMERICA SLEPT (2003). This view, however, does not reflect the impetus that led to the creation
of the Fund less than two weeks after the attack.
15. See 147 CONG. REC. H5894-915, S9589-601 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001). With only a few
exceptions, participants in the debate mentioned the compensation provisions of the bill only in
passing.
16. See 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (noting that scores of commentators on the pro-
posed regulations inpimeniing the Fund described it as "a testament to Congressional and
taxpayer generosity").
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billions in funds and services. t7 Many dissertations could be written
on the question of why September 11th evoked such an outpouring of
generosity that far exceeded the response to previous terrorist attacks
and other disasters, whether man-made or natural. 18 For our pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that the Fund was a component of this
overwhelming response.19
Going beyond an expression of sympathy for those who have suf-
fered a tremendous loss, the Fund can also be seen as a statement
about the unity of the United States. It serves as a declaration that
our society will pull together and rally around the victims of terror,
thereby demonstrating that the terrorists have failed in their goal of
weakening the fiber of our nation through chaos and fear. By protect-
ing the victims of September 11th, the government is also implicitly
reassuring Americans that if they were to fall victim to a terrorist at-
tack, their families would be well cared for. This reassurance was par-
ticularly important in the aftermath of September 11th, as it was (and
is) apparent that the attack was not an isolated random event, but a
component of an organized, well-funded, and sustained campaign
against American interests.
This discussion highlights the fact that the Fund serves a variety of
purposes, some of which, such as protection of the airlines, are di-
rectly linked to the tort system. Other purposes, however, bear no
particular connection with tort law. Rather, they connect more
closely with larger social welfare notions relating to governmental as-
sistance for those who are in need and are viewed as worthy of sup-
port. The Fund is, therefore, an amalgam of two different systems for
making payments to victims-the private law regime of tort rooted in
public law, which is based on the principle that wrongdoers should
compensate those injured by their wrongs, and social welfare pro-
grams which are based on the principle that government should pro-
vide assistance to those in need. Special Master Kenneth Feinberg has
himself framed the dilemmas that he has faced as rooted in the under-
lying ambiguity in the Fund-"Is it tort or is it social welfare?" 20
17. See Amanda Ripley, WTC Victims: What's a Life Worth, TIME, Feb. 6, 2002, at 23 (estimat-
ing charitable contributions to September l1th victims to total nearly $2 billion).
18. Id. (contrasting aid received by September l1th victims to other victims of terrorism,
crime and disaster).
19. See Robert Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1831, 1835-36 (2002) ("The fund was conceived as a grant of largess to the survivors of
those who had unwittingly served as surrogates for the rest of the American people."); Marshall
S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of Injury, 30 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1245, 1252 (2002) (noting that the Transportation Safety Act is a "symbol of dis-
placed vengeance and a marker of social compassion").
20. See Belkin, supra note 2, at 97.
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This Article explores some of the consequences of this blending of
frameworks that underpins the Fund. Part II points out that key fea-
tures of these respective systems are in tension with one another as
the social welfare system focuses on meeting needs, and emphasizes
the values of parity between claimants and administrative efficiency,
while the tort system seeks to replace losses and stresses individual-
ized consideration of each claim. The dichotomies between tort and
social welfare are far from absolute. Part II also describes a number
of programs that bridge the two models by importing private law con-
cepts into public law programs. It also notes that in the context of
mass tort litigation, the tort system increasingly draws on social wel-
fare principles.
Part III situates the Fund as an example of a public benefit program
that draws on private law principles. Unlike other programs of this
type, the payment of benefits based on a private law model is not con-
nected with a corresponding financing scheme based on private law.
The Fund makes expenditures directly from the federal treasury based
on principles largely drawn from tort law. This structure heightens the
tensions around the Fund as claimants are led to expect amounts that
are comparable to what they would receive in the tort system-
amounts that would be difficult to justify from a public benefits per-
spective. Part III then explores how Special Master Kenneth Feinberg
has sought to come to terms with these conflicts, concluding that he
has taken elements from each model in constructing his adjudicative
framework, but that his basic approach relies on a tort model tem-
pered with elements taken from a social welfare model. The ultimate
resolution of these conflicts, however, is impossible to discern as the
Special Master has retained large amounts of discretion to be exer-
cised on a case-by-case basis.
The Article then turns from substantive to procedural considera-
tions, noting in Part IV that the role of the Special Master is ambigu-
ous. Under a private law tort model, he appears as a mediator seeking
to bring claimants into what amounts to a settlement in a mass tort
case and then as an arbitrator who resolves their individual claims.
Under the public law rubric, he is an administrator dispensing benefits
in accordance with legal standards. The Article explains how Special
Master Feinberg appears to rely on a mediation and arbitration
model, rather than the administrative conception. Part IV goes on to
argue that while Special Master Feinberg's approach has a number of
benefits, he has not created a scheme in which the inherent fairness of
the procedure can be seen as validating the results. Thus, the scheme
falls short in one of the main goals of a procedural system-convinc-
2003]
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ing participants that they should accept the outcome because their
claims have been determined through the dispassionate application of
general principles to their particular circumstances. In both the sub-
stantive standards and the procedural model, the spotlight remains fo-
cused on the personal choices and values of Special Master Feinberg
himself. Regardless of how capable and well-intentioned the Special
Master, the Fund vests too much discretion in a single individual with
little means of accountability and oversight.
II. COMPARING SOCIAL WELFARE AND TORT REGIMES
The tort and social welfare systems both serve to protect people
from harm through the provision of financial payments after a harm
has occurred. Although both systems are creations of government,
tort law operates as a private law system in which rights and obliga-
tions run between private parties. In contrast, social welfare programs
operate in the arena of public law, in which the governmental role is
paramount: Government makes the decisions about the distribution
and extent of assistance and provides the resources that make the as-
sistance possible. The conception of tort as an aspect of private law
and social welfare as an aspect of public law have consequences for
how these systems are structured, how they operate, and the expecta-
tions that we place upon them. A full comparison of these two
frameworks for payments to victims is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 21 Any generalizations about them are inevitably crude, as both
systems recalcitrantly resist reduction to a few core or essential princi-
ples. Indeed, some maintain that distinctions between tort and social
welfare are artificial and that the two systems are best viewed to-
gether.22 Finally, both systems are continually in flux as they are con-
21. A full comparison would reveal that in addition to the contrasts discussed here, the two
systems have a number of similarities. For example, both systems could be viewed as dealing
principally with the promotion of socially desirable conduct, rather than support for those who
receive payment. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) (stating that the
first goal of accident law is "reduction in the number and severity of accidents"); FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that public wel-
fare systems are principally a device for regulating conduct in the labor market). Moreover.,
both systems are arguably underinclusive. The social welfare system only protects individuals
who fall into specified categories of the needy. See Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 467-86 (1987-1988). The tort system only provides compensation to
victims of recognized torts, leaving others with no means of recovery. See STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
22. Professor Stephen D. Sugarman, for example, argues that tort is, in essence, a form of
social welfare law. He writes:
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tinually contested. 23 Nonetheless, a number of characteristics
commonly associated with social welfare programs contrast sharply
with aspects of the tort system. This discussion will focus on these
contrasting elements. In particular, government benefit programs
tend to emphasize three intertwined values: equal treatment, adminis-
trative efficiency, and, most significantly, payment based on need.
The tort system, in contrast, assigns a high value to the principles of
individualized treatment and compensation based on loss rather than
need. Traditionally, the tort system pays little attention to the large
transaction costs that attend its operation. Despite these contrasts,
there is ample precedent for programs that appear to straddle the line
between these public law and private law systems. Like the Fund, a
number of these programs, such as workers' compensation, reflect de-
cisions to supplant the regime of tort law with a social welfare re-
gime.2 4 This section will consider the ways in which public benefit
programs incorporate and adapt features of private law systems. It
will also discuss mass tort settlements, a tort-based regime that draws
on elements of social welfare law.
Government benefit programs which incorporate elements of pri-
vate law models typically rely both on distributional principles that
Personal injury law . . . is a form of collective intervention into social and economic
affairs. We judge other forms of government action ... by comparing their costs and
benefits. So too, should we judge personal injury law.
SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at xvi. This paper does not stake out a position in the long running
debate about the "essential nature" of tort law. For our purposes, it is sufficient that the public
views tort law as a distinct and separate system from social welfare programs that are directly
administered by the government.
23. Many aspects of traditional tort principles are increasingly being called into question as
"tort reform" remains high on the political agenda in many state legislatures and in Congress.
See Thomas Edsell, Battle over Court Awards Takes More Partisan Turn, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
2003, at Al (noting that twenty-one states have passed some form of revisions to their tort law in
the past year and that several proposals on the issue are pending in Congress). Application of
traditional tort principles in the context of mass disasters has also been controversial. See PETER
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); JACK WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS
TORT LITIGATION (1995); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
Public Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L.REv. 849 (1984).
The social welfare system has undergone a thorough upheaval over the past decade with the
passage of welfare reform legislation. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. The characteristics of the new
system that is emerging are far from clear. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Ad-
ministration: Rules Discretion and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000).
24. In fact, some scholars have proposed replacing all or much of the tort system with admin-
istrative compensation models based on social welfare principles. See SUGARMAN supra note 21
(calling for a comprehensive social insurance scheme to replace tort law); Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scihme, 52 MD.
L. REv. 95i (i993) (discussing prospects for creation of a compensation system for victims of
mass torts based on models such as the Price-Anderson Act).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
draw from private law analogs and financing structures that are simi-
larly tied to private law systems. This connection between private law
payment principles and financing schemes serves to justify the use of
distributional principles that would appear questionable if the pro-
gram were perceived as simply a system of government transfer pay-
ments. Private law financing mechanisms therefore deflect questions
of distributional fairness that might come to the fore if the public un-
derpinning of the program were more apparent.
A. The Social Welfare Framework
As noted above, government benefit programs generally place a
high value on equal treatment, administrative efficiency, and the prin-
ciple of payment based on need. The value of equality can be seen
most clearly and in its crudest form in a number of governmental
death benefit programs that simply award a fixed amount to all who
are eligible. Federal programs awarding fixed sums to survivors of
military personnel killed in action reflect this model.25
Programs of ongoing support frequently rely on schedules of bene-
fits that provide uniform amounts subject to a discrete number of vari-
ables designed to take into account some variations in need. 6 Thus,
public assistance benefit levels and food stamp allotments typically
vary by household size.27 In some places, a few other variables, such
as housing costs, are factored in.28 The Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program, the federal program for the elderly and disabled poor,
provides a fixed monthly amount that the states may supplement. 29
As this discussion suggests, the goal of parity is complex. Recipi-
ents may not be similarly situated, so that identical treatment may not
be tantamount to equal treatment. Almost all government benefit
programs address the tension between uniformity and individualiza-
tion by greatly limiting the number of variables taken into account,
thereby putting great weight on the value of uniform treatment. Thus,
household size is frequently considered and the existence of other in-
25. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-77.
26. The State Documentation Project, a joint venture by the Center for Law and Social Policy
and the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, maintains a website with detailed state by state
information on public benefit programs. See http://www.spdp.org/index.htm (last visited Dec. 24,
2003).
27. Id. See also HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, RIGHTS OF THE POOR 148 (1997)
(discussing food stamp allotments).
28. See Jiggetts v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411 (1990) (New York state provides a separate shelter
allowance, equal to the recipient's actual rent, up to a maximum.).
29. See HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 27, at 73. In addition, payments may be re-
duced if the recipient is classified as "living in the household of another." See id. at 77-79.
[Vol. 53:719
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come and financial assets may be taken into account, but individual
variation in the degree of need for items such as transportation, cloth-
ing, food, and other necessities are commonly disregarded. 30
The goal of uniformity in government benefit programs serves an
important social end-it supports the notion that in a democracy, gov-
ernment should value all individuals equally and should not play a
direct role in maintaining social castes. This anticaste principle can be
seen clearly in the federal disability benefit programs. Individuals
who are unable to perform their past work because of medical impair-
ments will be expected to switch jobs if there are positions for which
they are qualified. 3' Thus, the disabled stockbroker would be denied
benefits if he or she could work another job, regardless of whether the
pay or social status is commensurate with his or her past work.32
At times, the priority given to uniform treatment can be harsh, and
ride roughshod over individual circumstances. Thus, variations in liv-
ing conditions and in many needs are not taken into consideration-a
family with car payments and a high rent will generally receive no
more than a family with few transportation costs and a low housing
expense. Regardless of the reality, variations in most expenses are
deemed matters of personal choice that do not justify greater levels of
governmental support.
In part, the emphasis on uniformity flows from a concern about ad-
ministrative efficiency. By shutting out a large number of variables
that affect the actual needs of recipients, government benefit pro-
grams avoid the need for countless individualized determinations. In-
stead, administrators can rely on predetermined fixed amounts as a
means of saving costs. Moreover, the use of benefit schedules facili-
tates the predictability of the program, enabling recipients and policy-
makers to plan more effectively. It also cuts down on the number of
disputes that must be resolved.33
30. The standardization of public assistance budgeting took hold in the 1960s. Before then,
benefit levels were calculated on an individualized basis in an attempt to tailor the assistance to
the particular circumstances of each household. The potential inequities in such a system, as well
as the administrative costs, led states to abandon individual consideration of items of need. See
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
31. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
32. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare
System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 390 n.92 (1996). However, the requirements for coverage by the
Social Security system tend to reinforce class distinctions as those without work records, or fa-
milial ties to a worker, are excluded from the Social Security system. Id. at 376-78.
33. This discussion is not intended to oversimplify the administrative aspects of public benefit
programs. See generally Diller, supra note 23 (discussing trends in welfare administration follow-
iug the enactment of welfare reform legislation). Significant aspects of most government benefit
programs do involve consideration of individual circumstances. For example, the recipient's in-
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One way or another, most government benefit programs take need
into account, as they are predicated on the goal of alleviating harm by
meeting needs. Most directly, many programs hinge eligibility upon a
showing of indigence. 34 Once eligibility is established, the availability
of income and resources may reduce the level of payments. Indeed,
the mechanism for establishing indigence and taking stock of any in-
come is a central focal point of the administrative apparatus in many
programs, including public assistance, food stamps, housing assistance,
and SSI.
Need standards arise most clearly from a desire to target assistance
to those who need it the most. In this sense, they assure that pro-
grams are efficient in alleviating hardships that would otherwise oc-
cur.35 Implicit within the idea of the need standard is the notion that
governmental support should provide some threshold living standard
to recipients-a floor, rather than simply some incremental amount of
assistance to a broad swath of people. This principle means that gov-
ernmental assistance programs generally redistribute income down-
ward-from taxpayers who have some means, to those with little or
no means.
36
The idea of meeting needs could, in theory, generate a robust de-
bate about what needs are appropriate for government to meet.
Should assistance recipients be supported at levels that permit some
"inessential" items? What should count as an essential? Although
this issue surfaces occasionally, the reality is that benefit levels are so
low in most needs-based programs that even the most basic needs are
come and assets are generally considered in determining financial eligibility. Similarly, disability
programs require individualized proof of disability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2000). The
question of whether recipients have satisfied conditions of eligibility, such as work requirements,
is also dealt with individually. The question of how much income people are expected to live on,
however, is almost always dealt with in some aggregated manner, subject to variation based on
only a limited number of factors.
34. See Martha B. Coven, The Freedom To Spend: The Case for Cash Public Assistance, 86
MINN. L. REV. 847, 852-863 (2002) (surveying means-tested programs).
35. See William Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1431, 1505-10 (1986). Needs testing is frequently associated with social stigma, as the process of
needs testing gives the government agency license to inquire into and supervise innumerable
aspects of applicants' lives. See Diller, supra note 32. Professor Simon, however, contends that
such stigma is not a necessary concomitant of needs testing.
36. This statement is not an assertion that governmental subsidies generally redistribute re-
sources downwards. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code is replete with subsidies that have pre-
cisely the opposite effect. Rather, the claim is that programs that are explicitly cast as a form of
governmental assistance are generally intended to meet needs. In contrast, subsidies enjoyed by
the middle class and the wealthy are generally disguised. See infra notes 47-55. It is a premise of
this Article that the packaging of governmental programs plays a critical role in how they are
perceived both by recipients of assistance and by the public. See Diller, supra note 32, at 454-63;
Simon, supra note 35.
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not fully met. Most programs make no attempt to calculate the pack-
age of godds and services that constitutes a floor, and any attempt to
do so would expose the woeful inadequacy of benefit levels. 37
B. The Tort Framework
In contrast to most public benefit programs, the tort system sets
award amounts based on the principle of individualized calculation of
loss. 38 The parties are charged with the task of presenting evidence of
the individual's economic and noneconomic losses, such as a pain and
suffering. Because each case is conceptualized as unique, cases are
not directly comparable and equality does not emerge as a central
concern. Because the task of calculating damages is generally as-
signed to the jury, and because elements of loss, such as pain and suf-
fering are not quantifiable, there is little oversight of whether losses
are treated the same across cases, or even whether the jury handles
them in a coherent manner.39 The potential for punitive damages fur-
ther exacerbates inequities that may-exist between the way victims are
treated.
The focus on individual calculation of economic loss means that
higher-earning victims receive greater awards than lower earners. The
tortfeasor who injures a CEO will be required to pay much more than
the tortfeasor who injures an indigent person. The system has the ef-
fect of enabling survivors of the deceased-CEO to maintain the lifes-
tyle they enjoyed before their loss. 40 By the same token, the survivors
of an indigent deceased are offered no leg up on the economic lad-
der-their award will reflect the limited earning capacity of the de-
ceased. In this way, the tort system protects individuals from loss of
37. For example, a family of three in Illinois may receive up to $377 a month in cash assistance
and an additional $318 in Food Stamps. See State & Policy Documentation Project, TANF Cash
Assistance: Categorical and Financial Eligibility Rules, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/cat-
fin.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2003) (listing maximum benefit levels by state). See generally
KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WEL-
FARE AND Low WAGE WORK (1997) (studying how mothers on welfare survive given the ex-
treme inadequacy of cash assistance).
38. See Kenneth Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort
Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 173 (1992) (describing "the right to custom-tailored compensation
for the actual loss suffered by the claimant" as a notion that lies at "the core of our traditional
conception of a tort claim").
39. Id. at 177-78 (pointing out that evidence of awards made to others with similar injuries
"not only is not binding-it is not even admissible").
40. Of course, the reality is frequently somewhat different, as large transaction costs eat away
at tort awards. See SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 40-41.
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their economic and social standing in a way that government benefit
programs generally do not.41
The individualized approach of the tort system imposes large ad-
ministrative costs as each case is processed individually through the
court system. Although the prevalence of settlement serves to reduce
these costs, even settlement involves the time and expense of attor-
neys for both parties, as well as some amount of case investigation,
discovery and preliminary litigation.
Tort law may also be seen as incorporating a principle of need-the
idea that an injury or death can result in significant financial loss to
victims and their dependents. In this sense, injury can be seen as a
proxy for need. But more realistically, tort law focuses on loss, rather
than need. Recovery can be had even when there is no loss of earn-
ings or other pecuniary loss. In addition, tort law makes no attempt to
set an economic floor or ceiling for victims. 42 The individual who
loses millions in future earnings due to the fault of a tortfeasor stands
to recover millions. Tort law thus serves to preserve the economic
status of victims and their survivors without reference to the degree of
need.43 Indeed, to the extent that tort law provides monetary com-
pensation for nonmonetary losses and punitive damages, it can easily
have the effect of leaving victims in a position that is financially supe-
rior to their state before the injury.
The difference between replacing losses and meeting needs consti-
tutes a fundamental difference between the tort regime and social
welfare programs. 44 The distinction creates a very different set of ex-
pectations among those who deal with the respective systems, as the
tort system holds out the potential for far greater awards. This differ-
41. See Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 799-803 (1990) (concluding
that "tort law intensifies social inequality").
42. John Goldberg has pointed out a significant strand in the literature on torts that advocates
replacing the goal of full compensation with the goal of meeting needs. See John Goldberg,
Misconduct, Misfortune and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034
(1997) (describing Judge Jack Weinstein's approach to torts as based on the goal of meeting
needs, rather than replacing losses). Professor Goldberg points out that Fleming James has most
fully developed this approach. Id. at 2044-51 (citing 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES,
JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1301; Fleming James, Jr., Some Reflections on the Bases of
Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REV. 293, 297 (1958)).
43. See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 304-05 (1992) (arguing that tort law reflects a
theory of corrective justice in which it appears as just to demand that an impecunious person
compensate a wealthy one).
44. See IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 113 (1993) ("The fundamental dif-
ference between individual liability and social insurance lies in their general objectives: the for-
mer aims at restoring the victim, by means of compensation, to his prior situation; the latter
proposes by means of welfare benefits to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth in
society.").
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ence in objectives can be linked to the source of the payments and
purposes of the systems. Tort awards are paid by the tortfeasors-
actors directly responsible for the losses. 45 Accordingly, tort law can
be seen as a means for requiring the tortfeasor to simply bear the cost
of its actions.46 Any diminution in the measure of damages may un-
dermine the deterrent effect of the award, as the tortfeasor will re-
ceive the benefit of its conduct while avoiding the full cost. Moreover,
the limiting principle of fault can be seen as adding a moral dimension
to this responsibility. In a dispute between victim and tortfeasor, the
claim that the victim does not really need the money has traditionally
not evoked much sympathy.
In contrast, in the social welfare regime, the payments stem from
the government, which is not generally viewed as the actor responsible
for the recipient's predicament. Thus, payment based on loss cannot
be justified by the misconduct of the payer. Social welfare payments
are generally conceived of as a means of alleviating hardship, a goal
which calls for only a threshold level of support. Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, full compensation of losses may effectively require tax-
payers to support those who are wealthier than they are, and thus are
not likely to be perceived as having needs that justify governmental
support.
C. Blending the Tort and Public Benefits Framework
1. Insurance Based Public Programs
A number of public benefit programs bridge the divide between so-
cial welfare's public law approach to aiding victims and the private law
model upon which the tort system is built.47 Most commonly, these
hybrid programs provide government mandated payments to victims
while drawing on the principles and imagery of insurance, a private
45. Tortfeasors may, in turn, be able to spread their losses in a variety of ways, including
insurance, bankruptcy, and by passing on costs to consumers. See CALABRESI, supra note 21, at
39-67 (discussing loss spreading).
46. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 43 (arguing that tort law centers on the relationship
between the injurer and the victim). Coleman writes:
The victim brings an action against his injurer because his (the victim's) claim to com-
pensation as a matter of justice is based on his claims about what the injurer did to him.
... To the extent tort law is a forum for vindicating claims to repair, the victim's con-
nection to his injurer is fundamental and analytic, not tenuous or contingent.
Id. at 381-82. But cf SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 55 ("The idea that tort law actually serves to
compensate the deserving by those who deserve to pay is a mirage.").
47. See Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121 (20n2) (discuss-
ing the Fund in lighi uf other compensation funds); Rabin, supra note 19, at 1853-67 (comparing
the Fund to other no-fault compensation schemes).
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law regime that is linked to the tort system. Programs organized along
these lines are known as social insurance. 48 Under the social insur-
ance rubric, government mandates that individuals or employers pay
into a fund. The fund, in turn, pays out benefits when prescribed con-
ditions are met.
Social insurance programs provide payments in a manner that strad-
dles the distinction between payment based on loss and payment
based on need. Because social insurance coverage must be earned
through employee or employer contributions, it does not protect
against need without a loss. For example, unemployment insurance
benefits are only payable when an individual loses a job. An individ-
ual who was never able to find a job in the first place is never covered
by the system. The idea of loss in social insurance programs is impor-
tant to creating the analogy to insurance, a system that seeks to re-
store a status quo ante for those who suffer a covered loss. Social
insurance programs also differ from traditional public benefit pro-
grams in that they generally do not engage in explicit means testing.
Millionaires can and do collect Social Security. In these respects, so-
cial insurance appears to depart from the general principle that social
welfare programs deal with need, while the tort system deals with loss.
Social insurance programs, however, also draw on concepts of pay-
ment based on need. Benefits are payable upon the occurrence of
particular events that are presumed to signify a high level of need.
Events such as the retirement, death, or disability of a wage earner
serve as proxies for financial need.49 In practice, a high proportion of
social insurance payments go to households that would be in poverty,
but for the government benefit. 50 Thus, while some millionaires col-
lect Social Security payments, the vast majority of recipients are indi-
viduals with extremely limited means.51 Moreover, the payments
under social insurance programs are limited, so that they do not effec-
48. See Simon, supra note 35 (discussing social insurance as a means of presenting public
benefits as private entitlements). See also MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SE-
CURITY (1979) (discussing political aspects of the social insurance model).
49. The treatment of spousal benefits in the Social Security program illustrates the program's
concern with need. The surviving spouse of a deceased wage earner is only entitled to benefits if
she is herself disabled, over age sixty, or caring for minor children. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (g)
(2000). A surviving spouse who does not meet these criteria receives no monthly benefits de-
spite the loss of the wage earner's income.
50. See JERRY MASHAW ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 100-02 (1992).
51. See Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg, The Historical Record: Trends in Family
Income, Inequality and Poverty, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 18,
43-44 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994) (observing that, while only a little over one third of
Social Security payments go to the poor, Social Security has'the effect of lifting 83% of the pre-
transfer elderly poor out of poverty).
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tively insure the living standard of upper income individuals. In these
ways, social insurance programs such as Social Security balance the
objectives of replacing losses with the goal of meeting needs.
These dual objectives create tensions that policymakers must strug-
gle to address. 52 The goal of creating an income floor calls for a dif-
ferent set of distributional principles than the goal of replacing losses.
To the extent that social insurance programs rely on payment princi-
ples that stray from the insurance-based model, they cast doubt on
and potentially jeopardize the image of the program as simply provid-
ing a return on individual contributions. If the programs hew closely
to the insurance framework, however, they are less efficient as a
means of preventing poverty and protecting against destitution. This
dilemma has informed Social Security policymaking since its
inception.
The financing system of social insurance programs thus creates a
dynamic that forms a critical component of the public's expectations
about the payment principles of these programs. Because they are
financed by contributions, the payments made by these programs are
not conceived of as direct government support for the wealthy, but
rather, are viewed as a return on amounts contributed. 53 Even though
these contributions are essentially taxes, and the distributional deci-
sions are made entirely by the government, Social Security benefits
appear simply as a return on an investment.5 4 This appearance has
created a cognitive separation between social insurance programs and
those programs which are explicitly a form of governmental support.
The financing structure both justifies and necessitates payment princi-
ples that draw heavily on loss, rather than need.55
A number of other programs that bridge the divide between public
law and private law models are directly linked to the tort system.
52. Martha Derthick has described the tension in the Social Security program between the
goal of meeting needs and the goal of paying benefits based on insurance principles. See
DERTHICK, supra note 48, at 213-227. Derthick describes how the principles of benefit payment
used by Social Security are a hybrid of these objectives, and that the balance between them has
shifted over time toward the goal of creating an income floor, rather than the objective of repli-
cating a traditional insurance scheme. Id. at 222-27.
53. See JOEL HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY
98-100 (1991) (describing how the contributory structure of Social Security creates the appear-
ance that no redistribution of income is involved).
54. See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that social security "contributions"
confer no vested rights); JAMES PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-
1994 73-76 (1994) (discussing how "contributions" are, in reality, simply taxes); Milton Fried-
man, Payroll Taxes, No; General Revenues, Yes, in THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 25-31 (M.
Boskin ed., 1977) (describing insurance language connected with Social Security as "imaginative
packaging")e
55. See Diller, supra note 32, at 383.
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Workers' compensation and no-fault auto insurance are explicitly de-
signed to temper inequities in the distributional consequences of the
tort system. These programs trade the promise of full individualized
compensation for a scheme of smaller yet more certain awards. 56
Other examples of public programs intended to supplant the regime
of tort law include the Price-Anderson Act, 57 establishing a fund for
victims of disasters at nuclear power plants, and the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act,58 which creates a no-fault system for com-
pensating individuals injured by childhood vaccines.
Like Social Security and unemployment insurance, these programs
also rely on a structure that serves to obfuscate the role of the govern-
ment and the distributive choices that it has made. Both the Price-
Anderson Act and the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act require industry
to make payments into a fund, which is available to pay claims.59 This
arrangement makes the programs appear as simply insurance schemes
mandated by the government, but paid for by industry. Similarly,
workers' compensation and no-fault auto insurance are designed as
insurance requirements, rather than direct governmental outlays. 60
Of course, the distinction between a mandatory premium that goes
into a fund that the payer has no control over and a program based on
taxation and governmental spending may be difficult to discern from
an economic perspective. 61
56. See KEETON, supra note 3, at 867-71 (discussing workers' compensation); 883-912 (discuss-
ing no-fault auto insurance).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act).
The Price-Anderson Act relies on a judicial model for the operation of compensation. Thus, it
is more closely linked to the tort system than programs which rely on administrative models.
The Act establishes a regime of strict liability for injuries resulting from "extraordinary" nuclear
occurrences and provides for the consolidation of all claims in a single federal district court. See
Rabin, supra note 24 at 955-56. Claimants may recover the full amount of their economic and
noneconomic losses unless it appears that the total liability of all claimants exceeds the amount
of the fund. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 99-660 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-310 (2000)).
59. The Price-Anderson Act is funded through a combination of private insurance and man-
datory industry contributions into a fund. See Rabin, supra note 24, at 955. The Childhood
Vaccination Injury Act establishes a compensation fund financed by excise taxes on the sale of
vaccines. Id. at 958.
60. See KEETON, supra note 3, at 868 ("Workers' compensation is a 'plan' for accident repara-
tion because the insurance mechanism for financing awards is made an integral part of the whole
approach."), 883-84.
61. Programs that limit or supplant tort claims, such as the Price-Anderson Act typically have
the distributional consequence of subsidizing a particular industry or class of market partici-
pants. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 64-66 (noting that the Price-Anderson Act passed at the
behest of the nuclear energy industry); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 53, at 77-78 (argu-
ing that the enactment of workers' compensation schemes constituted a victory by employers
over workers).
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These financing structures mean that payments to claimants do not
appear as direct transfer payments of taxpayer dollars to individuals.
The arrangement distances the government from the distributive
choices that are made. The recipients of an award under the Price
Anderson Act or the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act may not perceive
themselves, and may not be perceived by the public, as the recipients
of a governmental benefit program. In addition, the financing struc-
ture protects these programs from competition with other collective
needs of society as they appear to be self-funded. Thus, payments
under these programs are not directly weighed against other demands
for public support or the myriad other potential uses of public money
because the program raises the money that it spends.
2. Mass Tort Litigation as Public Law
While social insurance programs can be viewed as elements of the
social welfare system that incorporate features of private law, mass
tort litigation can be viewed as a feature of the tort system that incor-
porates aspects of public law. Indeed, it is possible to view mass tort
litigation principally as a form of social welfare policy that operates
through a private law regime.62 Settlements in mass tort cases are fre-
quently concerned with the values of parity between victims and with
ease of administration. Typically, settlements in such cases yield a
fixed pool of funds that must be distributed among claimants. Distri-
bution plans inevitably seek to allocate benefits equitably and through
a process that does not itself consume a large share of the funds' re-
sources. 63 Because the fund is generally the product of a compromise,
the goal of full compensation is generally not possible and claimants
frequently receive fixed amounts determined by a schedule. 64 Ac-
62. The vision of mass tort litigation as "public law" views such cases principally as a means of
satisfying the public responsibility to distribute compensation to victims of inevitable disasters.
See Goldberg, supra note 42, at 2057 (describing view of tort damages as a form of public disas-
ter relief); Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 2010, 2019-22 (1997) (viewing mass tort settlement
funds as temporary administrative agencies); Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 905-08 (arguing that
substantive duties enforced by tort law "are extrinsically imposed on the parties and are there-
fore inherently public"). See generally Weinstein, supra note 23 at 46-52 (describing broader
community interests at stake in mass tort cases and arguing that these interests should be explic-
itly addressed in such cases). But see Linda Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Para-
digm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U.L. REV. 579 (1994) (describing "public law" paradigm as
"unhelpful").
63. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 155-62.
64. Id.; SCHUCK, supra note 23; Hensler & Peterson, supra note 11.
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cordingly, mass tort settlement funds often have a number of features
that also characterize social welfare programs.65
However similar they may be to social welfare schemes, mass tort
settlements have a number of characteristics that are distinct from
traditional government benefit programs. Payments are rarely predi-
cated on need, because substantive tort law provides the organizing
principles of distribution. 66 Second, even though the defendant may
pass on the costs to the public through insurance and other means, the
Fund is not a government expenditure, but rather, is the product of a
private law system. Thus, the larger public interest in who receives
benefits and who bears the costs of the settlement lurks only in the
background of the arrangement rather than at the forefront.
III. THE MARRIAGE OF TORT AND SOCIAL WELFARE PRINCIPLES
IN THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
As this discussion has shown, in a number of respects, the private
law regime of the tort system operates based on different principles
than the public law framework of the social welfare system. As a pub-
lic benefits program that relies on tort principles to determine award
amounts, the Fund grafts a system of private law remedies onto a pro-
gram rooted in public law. This blending of tort and social welfare
regimes makes the Fund part of the family of programs that hybridize
the two models. The Fund, however, differs from its siblings in two
respects that serve to sharpen the tensions that are present in all these
schemes.
First, the Fund is a post hoc remedy, rather than a prospective alter-
ation of rights and responsibilities. Because the Fund only applies to
injuries relating to September 11th, it makes no attempt to fashion an
ongoing scheme for the compensation of terror victims. The Fund and
its implementing regulations have, therefore, been devised with full
knowledge of who the claimants are likely to be and the circumstances
leading to the claims. This retrospective aspect of the Fund sharpens
65. The legitimacy of these departures from traditional tort principles is still very much a
matter of debate. The United States Supreme Court's decisions on class action procedure reflect
great skepticism about the "mass justice" or "public law" aspects of mass tort settlements,
stressing that the conduct of the litigation must be measured against traditional standards of
procedural and substantive fairness. See Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997);
Ortiz v. Fibreboard 527 U.S. 815 (1999). The Court is particularly troubled by settlements that
allocate benefits to class members in ways which cannot be justified in traditional tort norms.
Amchem Products, 521 U.S. 591; Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815.
66. Judge Weinstein has noted, however, that the settlement in the Agent Orange litigation
was structured "with an eye to compensating the neediest class members quickly." See WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 23, at 158.
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the conflicts within it because there is no Rawlsian veil of ignorance
that can be drawn over the entire matter. Every decision yields an
identifiable set of winners and losers.67
Second, apart from its title, which falsely suggests the existence of a
specific pot of money devoted to compensation, the Fund lacks a fi-
nancing system based on a private law model that serves to justify the
use of private law principles for the payment of public money. Unlike
social insurance, workers' compensation, the Price-Anderson Act, or
the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, payments by the Fund come di-
rectly from general tax revenue, making the governmental role in de-
termining who gets paid and how much they receive apparent for all
to see. All payments from the Fund must be justifiable as governmen-
tal conduct. As a result, the tensions between the core values that
underpin the tort system and those that inform government benefit
programs come into conflict in a direct and unmediated way. If the
Fund completely ignores the principles that have tended to inform
government benefit programs, it may strike many as unfair-ignoring
basic questions of equity and lavishing government resources on many
who are already wealthy. However, to the extent that it builds in a
recognition of social welfare principles, the Fund will stray from the
tort paradigm and inevitably disappoint many victims who are seeking
full compensation for their losses.
These tensions have played themselves out in the implementation
of the Fund both through the Justice Department regulations and in
the policies announced by Special Master Kenneth Feinberg. 68 While
the Fund could be seen as a creative and positive union of tort and
social welfare principles, it has often come under fire. Some victims
have expressed fury at the extent to which the regulations and Fein-
berg's policies depart from traditional tort principles. 69 On the other
67. The retrospective nature of the Fund may have nudged Congress in favor of generosity, as
it may be viewed as more unfair to limit the recovery on tort claims that have already accrued
than to limit recovery on torts that have not yet happened. Indeed, if the Fund were perceived
as taking something away from September 11th victims, rather than conferring a benefit on
them, the Transportation Safety Act might have generated significant opposition.
68. The regulations implementing the Fund were issued by the Department of Justice, "in
consultation with the Special Master." September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67
Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002). Special Master Feinberg, however, has claimed the regulations
as his own. See Online NewsHour, Compensating Victims (Feb. 6, 2002) (stating that "these are
my regulations, not the administration"), at http://pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism.jan-june02/vic
time_2-6.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002].
69. See Lee Kreindler, WTC Victims' Compensation Fund: A Sad Disappointment, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 4. 2002, at 3 (stating that the Fund "will be devastating and unfair to the lives of most
claimants"); Ripley, spra note 17, at 22, David W. Chen, Worst Hit Firm Faults Fairness of Sept.
11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at Al.
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hand, some victims and many members of the public have raised eq-
uity concerns about the Fund, arguing that disparities in awards are
inappropriate and unfair 70 and that the category of recipients is
underinclusive. 71
Feinberg has attempted to walk a fine line between these two per-
spectives. He has frequently espoused values drawn from the social
welfare system and cautions that comparisons between the Fund and
the tort system are inappropriate. Despite his desire to avoid compar-
ison with the tort system, however, it is evident that the core organiz-
ing principles used by the Fund for determining awards are drawn
from tort law rather than social welfare law. The exact resolutions of
the tensions between the two are difficult to discern because they are
shrouded in an ambiguous cloud of discretion that Feinberg exercises
on a case-by-case basis.
The crux of the compensation scheme devised by Feinberg is reli-
ance on a table of presumptive awards. The presumptive awards are
based on the victim's age, marital status, number of dependents, and
income. 72 They include fixed amounts for nonmonetary losses such as
pain and suffering, loss of society and companionship, and loss of con-
sortium. The tables represent an attempt to standardize the treatment
of claimants by providing a single methodology for calculating losses.
They serve the familiar purposes of creating parity between claimants,
predictability, and administrative ease, which are all important goals
of most public benefit programs. They bear much in common with
benefit schedules that are a feature of many public benefit programs.
Yet, at the same time, by including variables such as income and
age, the tables yield a tremendous range in the size of awards. For
example, the survivors of a forty-five-year-old unmarried victim with
no dependents and an annual income of $10,000 prior to the attack,
stand to collect $300,000 under the tables. 73 In contrast, the survivors
of a thirty-year-old married individual with two children who had an
income of $150,000 stand to receive an award of over $4 million.74
Even when some of these variables are held constant, the range con-
70. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42 ("The more
needs a family is likely to have, the less well it fares.").
71. See David W. Chen, Traces of Terror: Compensation, House Gives Embassy Victims Same
Status as Those of Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A23; Belkin, supra note 2, at 95-96
(quoting victims of other acts of terrorism); Kolbert, supra note 70.
72. The tables are available on the internet. See http://www.usdoj.gov:80/victimcompensation/
loss-calc.html last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
73. This amount would be reduced by any collateral offset. See id. (The tables are titled "Pre-
sumed Economic Loss Calculation Tables Before Any Collateral Offsets.").
74. Id.
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tinues to be very wide. If the thirty-year-old victim described above
had earned only $20,000, the award would be cut from $4 million to a
little over $1 million.75 Any claim that the tables establish uniformity
and parity between victims can be met with the objection that they do
precisely the opposite, principally because the amounts for
noneconomic loss vary with the number of dependents, and the eco-
nomic component is based on income levels, a figure that of necessity
varies widely.
The component of presumptive awards reflecting noneconomic
losses is based on a series of flat amounts of $250,000 for each dece-
dent plus $100,000 for each dependent. Although these amounts seem
to be largely pulled out of thin air,76 their uniformity reflects Fein-
berg's decision to avoid the enterprise of individually valuing the de-
gree of physical and emotional pain and loss suffered by the victims
and their families. 77 He does not intend to make value judgments that
one victim suffered more than another or that the companionship of
one child's parent is worth more than another, or that the loss of one
spouse hurts more than the loss of another. 78
The unwillingness to make such determinations is heightened by the
fact that awards from the Fund constitute explicit governmental deter-
minations. Thus, any valuation of the quality of human relationships
and the pain of human suffering by the Fund carries with it the impri-
matur of the government and raises the question of whether govern-
ment should be in the business of making such valuations. Such
judgments cast the government in the role of valuing lives unequally, a
dubious proposition in a democratic society. As Frank Keating, Gov-
ernor of Oklahoma, explained in distinguishing awards made by the
Fund from jury awards in tort litigation: "[T]axpayer dollars should
not distinguish between those with and those without. The govern-
ment authors official inequity when it compensates a dishwasher at
the World Trade Center differently from the way it compensates the
person whose dishes were washed. '79
75. The range for thirty-year-old married victims with two children stretches from $879,000 to
$4.7 million. Id.
76. The notice in the Federal Register states that the $250,000 amount is based on the com-
pensation payable for military personnel killed in action and public safety officers killed on duty.
See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,239 (Mar. 13, 2002).
77. See Belkin, supra note 2, at 97.
78. In defending the presumed noneconomic loss awards, the Department of Justice explained
that "the Special Master believes it is important to have some measure of consistency among
awards, so that he does not have to "play Solomon" by attempting to place a value on human
lives on an ad hoc basis." 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,239.
79. Fi ank Keating, Dishwasher or Stockbroker: A Life's a Life, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at
B7. Keating argues that the Fund is built on the "unAmerican notion" that "the lives of the rich
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More practically, the uniformity of the amounts for noneconomic
loss also relieves claimants of the painful task of proving such dam-
ages individually. The prospect of forcing claimants to put on evi-
dence about where each victim was in relation to the plane crashes
and what they must have each suffered would have been difficult for
many claimants to endure.
The uniformity of these amounts, however, is a departure from the
traditional regime of tort law, which would call for an individualized
determination of all of these matters.8 0 Drawing on a tort model, the
Transportation Safety Act requires payment of awards based on the
harm to the claimant, including noneconomic losses, and states that
determinations are to be based on "the individual circumstances of
the claimant."81 Thus, Feinberg's use of a series of fixed amounts ap-
pears difficult to justify under the explicit terms of the Act. 2
From a tort perspective, the use of a fixed schedule of awards can
be seen as riding roughshod over the facts of each case-an attempt to
achieve wholesale justice that fails to recognize the unique human
qualities of each of the victims of September 11th. 3 The tables drain
the harms of their visceral impact, reducing them to figures on a chart
and making irrelevant the most searing aspects of the tragedy. By
fixing liquidated amounts for noneconomic harm, the tables make ir-
relevant issues on which many claimants will want to focus in proceed-
ings before the Special Master-the magnitude of the emotional
losses they have suffered. 4 Finally, consideration of individual cir-
cumstances may inevitably lead to higher amounts, given the magni-
tude of the suffering and loss. The reliance on a fixed schedule for
are more valuable than those of the indigent." Id. Keating's criticism is targeted principally at
disparities caused by variations in the levels of economic losses, since Feinberg has greatly re-
duced such disparities with respect to the noneconomic aspects of compensation.
80. See Abraham, supra note 38, at 186-89 (discussing how statutory caps on pain and suffer-
ing awards conflict with traditional tort principles).
81. Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
82. Indeed, in the one major legal challenge to the Special Master's scheme, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that any cap "would be a direct violation of the stat-
ute." Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
83. See Abraham, supra note 38, at 187-88 (noting that when caps are placed on pain and
suffering awards "the unique circumstances of those seriously injured victims whose pain and
suffering would [exceed the cap] therefore are ignored").
84. As one claimant put it: "I wanted [Feinberg] to hear what kind of father and what kind of
husband Frank was." See Sept. 11 Fund Offers More Than Expected, Lawyers Say, WASH. POST,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 49. At public meetings with Feinberg, the families of many victims focus on
conveying the trauma and loss that they have suffered as well as anger. See Ripley, supra note
16 (describing meeting between Feinberg and families). Of course, Feinberg has not prohibited
families from introducing such evidence, but it is not clear how it can affect the amount of the
award.
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noneconomic harm is easily cast as a statement that victims are getting
"less" than they would under a tort regime.8 5
Feinberg has resolved the dilemma between the individual treat-
ment promised by the tort regime and the need for governmental as-
sistance programs to treat people equally by providing that the
schedule is "presumptive" only and can be overcome by individual
factual circumstances. 86 In discussing this decision, Feinberg has indi-
cated that departures from the schedule amounts for noneconomic
losses will be rare, thereby tilting the scheme toward uniformity rather
than individual treatment.8 7 The formulation has two advantages.
First, as suggested above, fixed caps would violate the terms of the
Transportation Safety Act, which calls upon the Special Master to
adopt an individualized approach. Some flexibility is mandated by
law. Second, the presumptive schedule approach allows Feinberg to
publicly espouse the values of equal treatment reflected in the sched-
ule, while at the same time holding out the possibility of individual-
ized judgments that would placate those who seek it. In essence,
Feinberg is seeking to have it both ways-to communicate the values
of equal treatment and equal worth, while at the same time recogniz-
ing the individuality of each victim.
This solution may satisfy everyone, or it may satisfy no one. Propo-
nents of individualization may conclude that the emphasis on the table
of fixed amounts puts them in the position of arguing for a departure
from a "norm" which should not exist. Proponents of uniformity may
decide that the table is little more than a sham because the Special
Master retains complete discretion to depart from it in unspecified
circumstances. The upshot, at any rate, is a degree of ambiguity as to
how decisions are actually made by the Special Master.
The use of presumptive tables to determine economic losses raises
many of the same considerations, but there are a few significant differ-
85. See Richard Campbell, The September llth Attack on America: Ground Zero in Tort and
Insurance Law, 9 CONN. INs. L. J. 51, 76-77 (2002) (arguing that presumptive amounts for
noneconomic losses fail to compensate victims fully for their losses).
86. September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b)(2) (2001) (es-
tablishing procedure in which award is determined after individualized hearing at which the
Special Master or his designee will utilize the presumptive award methodology "but may modify
or vary the award if the claimant presents extraordinary circumstances not adequately addressed
by the presumptive award methodology").
87. See Special Master Kenneth Feinberg, News Conference Announcing Regulations Con-
cerning 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund at DOJ Conference Center (Dec. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/1220kenfeinbergnewsconference.htm) (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [here-
inafter News Conference of Dec. 20, 2001] ("You can come in, ask to be heard-the
noneconomic loss is pari of this, is presumptive-we'll hear what you have to say, but I am
dubious that we will make those distinctions.").
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ences. The use of schedules to address this component of awards en-
sures that all claims are based on a common set of assumptions about
how conditions in the labor market will change, including interest and
tax rates. But accurate calculation of economic losses necessarily re-
quires consideration of many factors which vary significantly among
claimants, including the likelihood of future unemployment, the ex-
tent to which future income can be projected from past income, and
the rate of growth of future income.8 8 For example, a thirty-five-year-
old stockbroker with an income of $70,000 in 2001 may have had very
different prospects than a thirty-five-year-old teacher who earned the
same amount in that year.89 The use of fixed schedules may yield ap-
parent uniformity, predictability, and equality of treatment, but it is
also more likely to be demonstrably inaccurate because it ignores or
averages many variables.90
Individualized consideration of economic loss does carry with it
some of the concerns about government sanctioned inequality that
came to the fore in the context of considering the noneconomic com-
ponents of awards, 91 but if it is accepted that lost earnings are an ap-
propriate component of compensation, it is not clear that the concern
about unequal valuations of lives is altered by the use of a matrix as
opposed to individualized consideration, as either method yields sub-
stantial disparities in awards. In addition, the task of calculating lost
earnings is nowhere near as value laden and subjective as individual-
ized valuation of noneconomic losses. Calculation of economic losses
that looks to data concerning each victim would yield results that are
in fact more defensible as accurate measures of loss than the matrix.
88. The schedules attempt to measure net economic loss. The total sum of projected earnings
is reduced to a present value and deductions are made for expenses that have been obviated,
such as taxes on the income and living expenses of the deceased. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC Loss, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/loss calc-deceased.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2003).
89. Cantor Fitzgerald, the firm which lost 658 employees on September l1th, has issued its
own study which attempts to show that, due to "the unique nature of Cantor Fitzgerald's busi-
ness, [and] its record of continuing growth and success," the presumptive tables significantly
understate the potential earnings of the Cantor employees who lost their lives. See Cantor,
Tradespark, eSpeed Family Center Information, available at http://www.cantorusa.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2003).
If the Special Master agrees with the report and discards the tables for Cantor employees who
represent over 20% of all victims, then it will be clear that the presumptive force of the tables is
quite weak.
90. See Abraham, supra note 38, at 190 (noting that individuals whose "claims might lie
outside the high end of any particular schedule [of damages] bear the risk that they will be less
than 'fully' compensated because their special characteristics are not taken into account").
91. See Keating, supra note 79.
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For all of these reasons, the use of schedules for economic losses
appears considerably more problematic than the use of fixed amounts
for noneconomic losses. Not surprisingly, the presumed loss schedule
has come under the greatest attack for its handling of economic losses.
Feinberg has defended the tables in several different ways. First, as
with the noneconomic component of awards, the regulations provide
that the schedules are presumptive only and do not preclude consider-
ation of individual evidence. 92 But, in discussing the economic loss
component of awards, Feinberg has sent mixed signals about the
strength of the presumption that the schedules create. The regulations
provide for deviation from the presumptive amounts "if the claimant
presents extraordinary circumstances," implying that the room for
flexibility is limited-in the "ordinary" situation they will be bind-
ing.93 In discussing the Fund, however, Feinberg describes the pre-
sumptions in ways that sound much more tentative-presenting them
more as a frame of reference for the consideration of individual cir-
cumstances. In announcing the regulations, Feinberg stated that,
"Any individual dissatisfied with the presumptive award, may submit
... documentation to change it, and may request a hearing to demon-
strate why the award is inappropriate or inaccurate. '94 On one televi-
sion news show, Feinberg said that he "invite[s] any family that feels
that the presumptive award is not fair in their individual case to file an
application requesting an appeal ... and we [sic] will review any indi-
vidual application and try as best I can to make sure that the families
are fairly compensated. ' 95 These statements omit any mention of an
obligation to present "extraordinary" circumstances. 96
Second, Special Master Feinberg sought to blunt criticism of the
presumptive tables by arguing that although awards under the tables
are more limited than recovery in tort would permit, claimants to the
Fund are spared the risks and delay of the tort system.97 In effect, he
92. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b)(2) (2002).
93. Id. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278
(Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)) (statement accompanying the proposed regu-
lations, asserting that the tables will be applied except when there is a "demonstration of ex-
traordinary circumstances").
94. News Conference of Dec. 20, 2001, supra note 87.
95. Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002, supra note 68.
96. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,243-44
(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104) ("The term 'extraordinary circumstances' is not
intended to signal that there is an unsustainable burden to justify departure from the presumed
award.").
97. Most recently, Feinberg stated that the awards he has made "compare very favorably to
the net recovery that a claimant might expect, if successful, under the conventional tort claim
alternative, givcn very ival iiigation risks on liability, damages and collectability, substantial
litigation expenses and large attorneys fees, as well as years of delay in actual receipt of any cash
2003]
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argues that the Fund embodies a bargain that represents a fair trade
off for claimants. This justification draws on an analogy to settlement
funds in mass tort cases where plaintiffs generally sacrifice the possi-
bility of large individual awards for smaller amounts paid out of a
common fund. Indeed, mass tort settlements commonly contain
schedules of awards similar to those devised by Feinberg for the
Fund.98 Moreover, the fact that victims can opt out of the Fund
makes the schedules appear almost as an offer of settlement rather
than a bargain struck by Congress on their behalf. A victim who opts
in can be seen as making a choice analogous to the decision to settle.
The difficulty with conceiving of the Fund as simply another mass
tort settlement is that, apart from sacrificing punitive damages and the
offset of collateral sources, Congress has not mandated that claimants
"compromise" their compensation levels by filing under the Fund. To
the contrary, the Transportation Safety Act defines economic loss as
"any pecuniary loss resulting from [the] harm.., to the extent recov-
ery for such loss is allowed under applicable State law." 99 Congress
provided that payments must be based on the "harm to the claimant,
the facts of the claim and the individual circumstances ... "100 Given
the terms of the legislation, it is difficult to conclude that Congress has
struck a bargain that gives the Special Master great power to limit
awards as part of some "compromise. '" 10 1
The analogy to mass tort settlements suffers from an additional
problem. In one way or another, dealing with inadequacy of funds is a
recovery." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Special Master Kenneth Feinberg
Regarding the Lawsuit Against the September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund (Jan. 27, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/January/03-civ043.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
See September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,237 ("Civil litigation
often takes years, with awards varying greatly from one claimant to another, particularly where
the incomes of the victims vary. Indeed under the tort system, while many claimants receive
extremely large awards, many others walk away empty-handed due to the requirement that
plaintiffs prove fault."). Feinberg has also stated, "[I]t is not fair to compare this program to
what might happen in the roll-of-the-dice casino, in the lottery system that is the courtroom."
See Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002, supra note 68.
98. As Special Master for the Agent Orange Litigation, Feinberg devised a distribution plan
that was also based on a schedule of awards. In devising the plan he rejected the idea of creating
a compensation system that would seek to replicate the results of the tort system. See SCHUCK,
supra note 23, at 211-15.
99. Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 402(5). Noneconomic losses are defined in sim-
ilar unlimited terms. Id. § 402(7).
100. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
101. Feinberg has alluded to the phrase "individual circumstances" as support for the notion
that he has broad discretion to take into account factors other than harm to the claimant. See
infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. Whatever the scope of this discretion, it is difficult
to justify reliance on fixed schedules based on congressional language calling for individualiza-
tion. See infra notes 115 and accompanying text.
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central problem in creating compensation schemes in mass tort cases.
Whether due to settlement or the actual or threatened bankruptcy of
defendants, administrators of mass tort settlement funds are placed in
the position of allocating a fixed amount among a large number of
claimants. The Fund does not present this problem, as it has no cap.
Ironically, the open-ended nature of the Fund makes its administra-
tion more difficult because the Special Master cannot parry discontent
about awards with claims that he would have liked to have awarded
more but that the Fund is simply inadequate. Absent such a limit, he
cannot play claimants off against each other, but must be prepared to
justify each award as an appropriate amount of compensation on its
own terms.
Finally, the "settlement" conception of the Fund would seem to jus-
tify any principle of compensation Feinberg selects on the ground that
claimants are free to opt out and proceed individually. As an expres-
sion of public support and compassion for the victims, Congress has
mandated that their losses be compensated. It has not simply author-
ized Feinberg to, in effect, negotiate with the claimants.
If the schedule of awards cannot be justified from within the tort
model, it can be readily supported by notions drawn from the social
welfare context. First, the tables represent an attempt to promote par-
ity among claimants by assuring that similarly situated claimants are
treated the same. Second, the tables reflect the view that the level of
payment should bear some relation to need. The aspect of the tables
that most clearly reflects these objectives is the fact that the tables
only extend to an income of $231,000, identified as commensurate
with the ninety-eighth percentile of individual income in the United
States. Although Feinberg has continually denied that the absence of
a table for higher incomes amounts to a cap, he has stated that "there
is a presumption that that will be the upper level of the award. '' 10 2
Feinberg has been explicit in arguing that his tables represent an
attempt to compress the range of awards made by the Fund. 10 3 As he
has explained, "[w]e are not trying to promote vast disparity. We're
trying to interpret [the statute] in a way that will minimize the high
102. News Conference of Dec. 20, 2001, supra note 87.
103. At one point, Feinberg stated: "I don't want a system that gives $6 million to the stock
broker on the 38th floor and $38,000 to the waiter at Windows on the World." See Bob Van
Voris, Fund Boss Spurns Huge Payout Gaps, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 10, 2001, at Al. But see Roger
Williams, A Conversation with Ken Feinberg.- In Solomon's Footsteps, FOUND. NEWS & COM-
MENT., Sept.-Oct. 2002, available at http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/article.cfm?ID=2214
(last visited Dec. 26, 2003). Feinberg stated that "the rich getting richer doesn't bother me at all.
You'd be hard pressed to think of a federal entitlement that's not based on economic variables.
Social Security and Medicare come immediately to mind." Id.
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from the low." 10 4 The tables accomplish this objective by limiting the
awards at the upper end, averaging out variables used to calculate ec-
onomic loss, and providing a floor in the form of liquidated amounts
for noneconomic losses.
Implicit in this desire to limit the spread of awards is an assumption
that the purpose of the Fund is to provide a kind of income floor that
will meet the financial needs of victims. Feinberg has made this as-
sumption explicit, stating that "Congress wanted to make sure that
there is a safety net below which nobody would go and find them-
selves destitute. '" 10 5 Further, the regulations provide that, in deter-
mining awards, the Special Master will take into account "the financial
needs or financial resources of the claimant, or the victim's depen-
dents and beneficiaries. ' 10 6 This view supports Feinberg's goal of rais-
ing the bottom and reducing the top. Thus, while declining to publish
a guaranteed floor for awards, Feinberg has stated that he will take
need into account to boost awards to individuals at the low end.10 7 At
the opposite end of the spectrum, he has explained that "multi-million
dollar awards out of public coffers are not necessary to provide [the
wealthiest high income victims] with a strong economic foundation
from which to rebuild their lives."' 10 8
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of need as a consideration, instead of
simply looking to loss, has infuriated many claimants. As one family
member told Feinberg: "The idea is to compensate me so my life style
doesn't change, and my life style is different from a guy washing
dishes." 109 On the other hand, some members of the public have
104. News Conference of Dec. 20, 2001, supra note 87. See id. ("[W]e've done a pretty good
job of trying to prevent disparate treatment with wildly inflated, high awards and depressingly
low small awards.").
105. Online NewsHour Feb. 6, 2002, supra note 68.
106. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2002).
107. The regulations do provide a floor of $500,000 for victims with spouses or dependents
and $300,000 for those without, but these amounts are subject to collateral offsets. See id. See
also Ripley, supra note 17, at 24 (quoting Feinberg as promising that he will make sure "no one
gets zero").
108. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278 (Dec.
21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104); see id. ("Any methodology that does nothing more than
attempt to replicate a theoretically possible future income stream would lead top awards that
would be insufficient relative to the needs of some victims' families and excessive relative to the
needs of others."); 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,237 (Mar. 13, 2002) ("[P]roviding compensation
[above the level of the tables] would rarely be necessary to ensure that the financial needs of
[the] claimant are met.").
Although it found that issues relating to the application of the Special Master's regulations are
not subject to judicial review, the Second Circuit noted that his statements of intent to reduce
awards due to lack of need "are hard to square with the text of the Act" since they suggest a
form of de facto cap on awards. Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 145 (2nd Cir. 2003).
109. See Kolbert, supra note 70, at 47.
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voiced complaints about a public policy that makes millionaires out of
World Trade Center widows but leaves victims of other disasters with-
out any comparable redress. 110
To the extent that the Fund has embraced need and uniformity as
objectives, Feinberg has cast them loose from their moorings in tort
law and embraced a social welfare vision of compensation. The over-
all justification for this approach that the Special Master articulates is
that it is inappropriate to ask the public to foot the bill for awards that
would result from application of a pure tort model."' 1 In essence,
Feinberg sees the Fund as an expression of Congress's desire to meet
the needs of victims, rather than simply as a means of compensating
their losses. 112
110. See Charles Laurence, Envy over Cash for World Trade Center Victims, SUNDAY TELE
GRAPH, Sept. 8, 2002, at Al (reporting that founder of victims group has received hundreds of
telephone calls and emails accusing families of greed).
111. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278
(Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 2003).
112. Applying Chevron deference, the Second Circuit upheld the Special Master's contention
that the language in the statute that permits consideration of "the harm to the claimant, the facts
of the claim and the individual circumstances of the claimant," Transportation Safety Act, supra
note 1, § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added), authorizes him to take need into account See
Schneider, 345 F.3d at 147.
The court, however, was clearly troubled by the Special Master's invocation of need as a
means of simply reducing awards that would otherwise appear "unseemly." Id. It stated:
[To the extent the Special Master is employing a need based analysis to compute
awards, he has introduced some limit on what would otherwise be proper compensation
under the Act. Such a notion, in our view, would seem contrary to what Congress
aimed to accomplish in the statute. The overriding purpose of the statute is, of course,
fair compensation for economic and non-economic loss. Therefore, even though the
Special Master has authority to conduct a thorough analysis, he should take into full
account a claimant's economic loss, as specifically required by the statute, before evalu-
ating need-based circumstances. This slight shift in approach has the virtue of more
closely reflecting Congress's aim as well as appearing to be more fair to claimants.
Id.
There is, however, no indication that Congress viewed the reference to "individual circum-
stances" as permitting inquiry into need. To the contrary, all specific references to the basis for
awards refer to the calculation of losses. For example, in describing the information to be pro-
vided in the application form, Congress did not mention information on the extent of the claim-
ant's need, or lack thereof. See Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(a).
A few statements from the congressional debate support the proposition that the Fund is
intended to meet needs, but for the most part, these statements refer to the collateral offset
requirement. See 147 CoNG. REC. S9599 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) ("This program is
targeted to help the neediest victims and their families. When making the determination, the
Special Master will take into account any life insurance, death benefit, or other government
payment received by the victims and their families."). Senator John McCain offered a more
general statement that "the intent of the Fund is to ensure that the victims of [the] unprece-
dented, unforeseeable, horrific event, and their families, do not suffer financial hardship in addi-
tion to the terrible hardships they have already been forced to endure." See 147 CONG. REV.
S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain). Of course, the goal of alleviating hardship could be accom-
plished by boosting awards in particular cases, without reducing awards in other cases.
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The aim of meeting needs implicitly calls for judgments about what
counts as a "need" as opposed to a mere desire. The line that Fein-
berg has drawn-replacement of lost income based on no more than
$231,000 a year-is remarkably high in comparison to almost any
other measure of economic "need" in our society. At the same time,
the awards are insufficient to enable some victims to maintain the
lives that they had prior to September 11th, when housing costs, pri-
vate school tuition, and the like are taken into account. 113
In this regard, Feinberg's promise to consider individual circum-
stances is significant.' 14 It is clear that the $231,000 a year income
threshold is not a ceiling, but rather a marker beyond which determi-
nations will be made on a case-by-case basis. The Special Master, how-
ever, has not articulated any theory of need that would provide
coherence to his handling of the issue. He has set forth no statement
of principles upon which awards above the tables will be made. It is
not clear whether he will look to the magnitude of the lost income, the
size of the monthly bills that a family faces, or some combination of
the two. One can only speculate about what kind of "needs" will
move him to find "extraordinary circumstances." Will the need to
make payments on a summer home as well as a primary residence
qualify as a "need?" Will college tuition costs justify awards in excess
of the schedule? Alternatively, will departures from the schedule fo-
cus on solely producing a more accurate measure of an individual's
lost earnings? The use of elaborate matrices with detailed explana-
tions to calculate economic loss contrasts sharply with Feinberg's gut
instinct approach to need, which may amount to little more than a
means of alleviating sticker shock over the magnitude of lost income
in high earner cases.
As Feinberg has structured it, it is difficult to conceive of the Fund
as a safety net in the sense that the term is generally used-as a means
of preventing destitution. At the same time that the Special Master
has advanced a social welfare vision of the Fund, he continues to rely
on the fundamental tort concept that lost income should form a princi-
ple basis for the award. As a result, the Fund is predicted to generate
awards that average in the seven figures. It is an odd kind of "safety
113. For example, one widow offered the following objection to the tables:
This is not to make me rich at all. It would be so I would not have to sell my house, so
that I could keep my kids at the same school where they're going and I could live where
I am and maintain the same standard of living as if my husband were still providing for
us.
See Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002, supra note 68 (statement of Laurie Laychak).
114. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(b) (2002)
(providing that claimants may present evidence concerning financial need at hearings on claims).
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net" that results in upward income redistribution. In reality, Fein-
berg's approach incorporates need as a principle around the margins,
rather than as a fundamental organizing principle for determining
awards. If both loss and need are, as Feinberg maintains, factors that
are cognizable under the statute, he could have organized the pre-
sumptive tables around need, with adjustments at the margins for loss,
rather than the other way around. Given the fact that tort measures
of compensation are explicitly referenced in the governing statute,
and that considerations of need can only be read into the language
with difficulty, the hierarchy that Feinberg has assigned to these dif-
ferent goals is not surprising. 115
The tensions between the tort and social welfare aspects of the
Fund also inform some of the disputes that have arisen concerning the
collateral offset of award amounts.116 The traditional tort rule does
not permit the reduction of awards based on payments the victim has
received from collateral sources. 117 The requirement, therefore, can
be viewed as an instance in which Congress departed from traditional
tort principles to target awards toward the goal of meeting the other-
wise unmet needs of victims. 1 8
The offset raises concerns that arise in all government benefit pro-
grams that take into account the income and resources of recipients in
determining assistance levels. The principles of payment based on
need and equal treatment of all individuals with the same level of
need suggest that all income and resources should be taken into ac-
count. Applied rigorously, however, such a system creates significant
perverse incentives that discourage self support. In public benefit pro-
grams, the problem is that strict needs testing penalizes recipients for
working, potentially reducing their assistance by an amount that is
115. In cautioning the Special Master to calculate losses before looking to need, the Second
Circuit took a similar view that need should play a subordinate role in the calculus. See Schnei-
der, 345 F.3d at 147.
116. See Tim O'Brien, Cracks in Plaintiff Bar's Solidarity: Sept. 11 Survivors Caught Between
Competing Brands of Legal Advice, N.J. L.J. Jan. 28, 2002 at 1 (referring to the collateral offset
as "the most controversial aspect" of the Special Master's interim regulations).
117. See Abraham, supra note 38, at 190-91.
118. See Rabin supra note 18, at 1854-55 (referring to deduction of collateral source payments
as reflecting a commitment to meeting needs that is incongruent with the tort based aspects of
the Fund).
Alternatively, the deduction of collateral source awards could be justified without regard to
need-as simply a means of preventing the overcompensation that would result from multiple
payments for the same loss. In the tort system, deduction of collateral sources has the effect of
letting the tortfeasor off the hook, arguably resulting in underdeterrence. That concern is not
present in the Victim's Compensation Fund, because tortfeasors are not paying.
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equal to the amount earned. 119 Similarly, the accumulation of savings
can render a recipient completely ineligible for aid. Most benefit pro-
grams address this dilemma by splitting the difference-for example,
by "disregarding" some portion of earnings and savings. 120
In the context of the Fund, the concern about perverse incentives
takes the form of an objection to the deduction of collateral sources
on the ground that victims who planned ahead and purchased large
amounts of life insurance should not be "penalized" for being careful
by a reduction in their awards.121 Moreover, the possibility of includ-
ing charitable contributions in the offset raised the possibility of both
"penalizing" families for accepting charity and nullifying the effect of
the charity so that the generous contributions would serve only to save
the government money, rather than helping victims. These concerns
are particularly acute with respect to families of emergency service
workers, whom many might view as most deserving of large awards,
but who stand to collect relatively low amounts because they are pro-
tected by pension benefit plans. 122
But more fundamentally, the negative reaction by claimants to the
collateral offset focuses more on the way the Fund has been presented
to the public. Although the media has reported extensively about the
generous awards claimants may receive, including the announcement
that awards will average almost $2 million, the reality is that the col-
lateral offset requirement will substantially reduce the actual recov-
eries that families receive and greatly increase the disparity between
awards and potential tort recoveries.
Thus, the collateral offset creates a gap between the perception and
the reality of the Fund that has fueled a backlash against the families
of victims who are unhappy with the Fund. It is possible to build a
case that the Transportation Safety Act undermines the ability of fam-
ilies to seek damages from potentially responsible tortfeasors, turns
large segments of the previously sympathetic public against them, and
119. See Marie Cohen, Earned Income Disregards, Welfare Information Network (Apr. 1997),
available at http://www.financeprojectinfo.org/Publications/income.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2003) ("[Rleducing benefits by one dollar for each dollar of earned income may discourage work
unless a recipient can make more, after paying work expenses, than the benefits she can receive
without working").
120. See id. (discussing state policies on treatment of earned income in the Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families program).
121. See Nicholas Varchaver, What's a Life Worth, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 126 ("Many saw
[the collateral source reduction] as penalizing those who had been responsible enough to plan
for the future of their loved ones.").
122. See O'Brien, supra note 116.
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in many cases, provides only a modest net award. It is not surprising
that some families feel manipulated and bitter about the process. 23
In sum, Feinberg has dealt with the tensions between the tort and
social welfare aspects of the Fund by placing a primary emphasis on
the tort model but tempering it with features drawn from the social
welfare model. He has enshrouded this basic choice with a cloud of
ambiguity, reserving the discretion to restrike this balance in individ-
ual cases as he sees fit. Feinberg's approach may constitute a reasona-
ble compromise between the competing models, but, like many
compromises, it lacks any underlying principle. If, as Feinberg argues,
the statute does permit him to take need into account in determining
an "appropriate award," then why do the compensation tables provide
large discrepancies in awards based on past earnings rather than
need? If, as Feinberg has also maintained, he is required to base
awards on a measure of economic and noneconomic loss, how can he
ignore the extent of economic loss for the wealthiest victims who have
suffered the largest losses? Finally, it remains unclear whether Con-
gress has authorized Feinberg to strike such a balance, or whether the
Transportation Safety Act calls for the unmitigated application of tort
law principles, despite the questions such principles raise.
IV. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND THE FUND
The tension between the tort and social welfare paradigms under-
pinning the Fund has consequences for the procedural regime that it
employs. The conception of the Fund as analogous to a mass tort set-
tlement carries with it a different set of procedural expectations than
does the view of the Fund as a government benefit program. The Spe-
cial Master could be thought of as a mediator seeking to give structure
to a settlement fund in a manner that dissuades victims from opting
out, or as an adjudicator who determines legal entitlements under
governing principles of law. The two roles carry with them very differ-
ent images about the kinds of conduct appropriate to the office of
Special Master. Given the tensions inherent in the substantive poli-
cies that the Fund implements, the choice of procedural model is
likely to have a large impact on the overall perception of its fairness.
As this section explains, Congress and Feinberg have established a
procedural system that in some ways serves to exacerbate, rather than
dampen, the tensions concerning the Fund. At the same time that
123. See Ripley supra note 17, at 27 (quoting one widow as referring to the Fund as a "cheap
bribe"); Laurence, supra note 110 (quoting another surviving spouse as stating "we are very
angry because the government is using 9/11 families as pawns").
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Feinberg espouses a social welfare perspective in discussing the sub-
stance of the Fund, when it comes to procedure, his approach is drawn
from the mass tort context. This conception of the Fund permits the
fact that the measure of awards is based on a tort model to obscure
the fact that claimants have legal entitlements that call for treatment
of their claims in accord with principles of public law governing the
provision of government benefits.
In creating a program with broad and vague substantive standards
that call for individualized determinations, Congress placed great au-
thority in the hands of those charged with implementing the Fund.
These aspects of the statute, however, do not necessarily give the Spe-
cial Master greater authority than, for example, that accorded to other
agencies administering government benefit programs. 124 Two aspects
of the statute, however, do confer administrative discretion beyond
the "normal" template. First, the Transportation Safety Act precludes
all judicial review of awards, and second, it does not provide claimants
with a right to a "hearing on the record," thus leaving the Special
Master free of judicial oversight and unfettered by the procedural re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) that govern
formal adjudication. 125
Given this enormous discretion, the statute casts a spotlight on the
office of the Special Master. Because of the absence of legal con-
straints, the perception of fairness in the implementation of the Fund
is heavily dependent on the conduct of the Special Master and on his
decisions about how to structure the adjudicative process. Seen in this
light, the promulgation of presumptive tables contains important ele-
ments of procedural fairness, regardless of their substantive advan-
tages and disadvantages. By publicly disclosing his starting point for
the calculation of awards, Feinberg has provided an important means
124. See, e.g., Shweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981) (noting the "exceptionally broad
authority" of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in administering the Social Security
Act).
125. The Act provides that the Special Master will develop a claim form and will issue written
determinations within 120 days of the filing of claims. See Transportation Safety Act, supra note
1, § 405(a)(2) (form); § 405(b(3) (120 day requirement). Claimants have the right to appear
through an attorney and to present evidence, including witnesses and any other "due process
rights determined appropriate by the [S]pecial [M]aster." See id., § 405(b)(3)-(4). The omission
of a right to a decision after a hearing "on the record" signifies that the formal procedures of the
APA are not applicable. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000) (Formal procedures apply when statute
requires that a determination be made "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.").
The prohibition on judicial review of awards raises constitutional questions that are beyond
the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that although award amount may not be
challenged, Congress has not immunized the Special Master's procedures from judicial review.
See Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
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of enabling claimants to determine whether to file with the Fund. In
the absence of such tables claimants would be forced to choose be-
tween litigation and the Fund without any means of predicting how
they would fare under the Fund. 26 Second, the tables and the accom-
panying documentation showing how they were calculated provides
claimants with a framework for assembling their cases. The tables en-
able claimants to determine whether they have a strong case for chal-
lenging the application of the presumptions to their claims and to
gauge the impact of altering one or more assumptions that are built
into the tables. 127
The fact that claimants can seek departures from the tables, how-
ever, begs the question of when and how Feinberg will use his discre-
tion. This becomes the key question for claimants as they proceed
with the process. The issue of procedural fairness centers on whether
Feinberg has structured an adjudicatory system that bolsters rather
than undermines confidence in the fairness of the results it produces.
One way or another, the question returns to Feinberg himself because
the procedures are all focused on his decision-making process. On
this score, Feinberg has handled himself in a manner that is not likely
to promote a perception of the Fund as a fair administrative mecha-
nism. Feinberg has adopted a high profile approach with the media
and the public. His tendencies to philosophize, argue, console, and
offer predictions and advice about the Fund all emphasize his own
personal role in making decisions. As a result, awards appear as the
product of Feinberg's personal choices and preferences rather than as
the product of dispassionate principled application of legal standards
to facts.
It is easy to admire Feinberg's candor and accessibility. He has
spent hundreds of hours meeting with victims and others discussing
126. See September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,278
(Dec. 21, 2001) (articulating goal that "claimants [should) be able to enter the program-or
choose not to enter the program-with an understanding of how their claims will be treated").
127. If Feinberg insists that all the calculations that went into deriving the amounts in the
tables must be viewed as a package, claimants may not be able to rely on some aspects of the
calculations while maintaining that other aspects are inappropriate as applied to them.
In addition, Feinberg has publicized descriptions of selected awards as a means of disseminat-
ing information about the program. See Martin Kasindorf & Zubin Jelveh, Sept. 11 Lawyers
Counter Critics of Federal Compensation Fund, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2002, at A5 (reporting on
fourteen awards). However, the publicized information is too general to be of great value to
claimants preparing claims. This information, together with aggregate statistical data about
awards are available on the internet. See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments.
html (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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the Fund and answering questions,128 and he offers to meet with fami-
lies prior to their filing claims to give them an idea about the magni-
tude of the award they would receive.12 9 He freely admits the difficult
choices with which he has been faced and even his own ambivalence
about the statute that he implements.1 30 Feinberg has taken great ef-
forts to convince the families of the fairness of the Fund and to urge
them to file claims. Feinberg frequently asks families to place their
trust in him to "do the right thing" 131 and promises that for any fami-
lies in need who would not otherwise be eligible for an award, "I will
exercise my discretion and make sure that anybody like that gets a
substantial paycheck.' 32 He is unabashed in touting the Fund as su-
perior to the alternative of litigation.133 He presents himself as the
personification of the Fund, referring to it in the first person posses-
sive-as "my program" and "my regulations."1t 34
Feinberg offers a highly personal form of justice. In this day of
large bureaucratic institutions, when public officials routinely distance
themselves from the choices they make, there is a refreshing quality to
the personal stamp that Feinberg has placed on the Fund. For claim-
ants, the process is, therefore, presented as a human interaction, a mo-
ment at which the Special Master, possessing essentially absolute
authority, will take stock of the family's tragedy and loss. A New
128. See Online NewsHour, Victim Compensation (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/terrorism/jan-june02/victims_3-7.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Online
NewsHour, Mar. 7, 2002] ("I have spent almost daily ... over the last ten weeks traveling all
around the country meeting with the families.") Kolbert, supra note 70 (noting "several dozen"
sessions with families).
129. See Online NewsHour, Mar. 7, 2002, supra note 128.
130. See, e.g., Julie Kay, Doubts from the Hot Seat, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Nov. 15,
2002, at A3 (noting Feinberg's quip that the statute establishing the Fund "was carefully
crafted-it took two hours in the middle of the night" and his concern that the Fund creates "an
unfortunate precedent"); Kolbert, supra note 70 (reporting Feinberg's doubts about whether the
Fund is a good idea).
131. See Dirk Olin, Crossfire, AM. LAw., Sept. 4, 2002, at 2 (reporting Feinberg's statement
that the statute gives him the ability to "do the right thing"); Ripley, supra note 16, at 22 (report-
ing Special Master Feinberg's appeal that families "leave it to me" to make sure they are treated
fairly).
132. Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002, supra note 68.
133. See Kay, supra note 130 (quoting Feinberg as asserting that families who pursue litigation
rather than filing claims with the Fund are making a "big mistake"); Williams, supra note 106
(characterizing litigation as "a loser's game" for families); Online NewsHour, Feb. 6, 2002, supra
note 68 ("I'm hoping, and the Attorney General is hoping, that when these regulations are
promulgated .. . they will agree that it is better for them to stay in this program, forget the
lawsuit, come in and within 120 days . . . they will get a check").
134. Online NewsHour, Mar. 7, 2002, supra note 128 (calling the Fund "my program"); Online
NewsHour, supra note 68 (calling the Fund "my regulations"); Olin, supra note 131, at 2 (quot-
ing statement by Feinberg that "only ten suits have been brought at this point-and a couple of
those filers are now trying to get back into my program").
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York Times reporter who was permitted to sit in on one hearing,
found Feinberg's attitude to be "professional" and "his demeanor em-
pathetic. ' 135 One claimant reported that Feinberg "just sat there with
me for forty-five minutes and talked to me about everything... When
I walked out of the office, I felt very reassured. I felt that I might
actually have a hope and a chance .... I also felt that I could go and
see him anytime I wanted.' 36 Feinberg presents an appeal that claim-
ants and the public should trust the Fund because they should trust
Mr. Feinberg. The implicit pitch is that he is worthy of trust because
of his empathy with the victims as evidenced by his tremendous acces-
sibility to them.
Feinberg's conception of his role draws on the model of the Fund as
a mass tort settlement mechanism. In this tort-based conception of
the Fund, Feinberg appears in the role of the mediator, struggling to
get all parties to agree on an imperfect resolution. 137 Like all
mediators, he emphasizes the risks of litigation and the benefits of
nonadversarial settlement. Under this view of his office, Congress has
charged him, not only with the task of administering the Fund, but of
convincing victims to opt in, rather than go to court.138 Feinberg is
both the salesman and the product itself. These dual roles echo Fein-
berg's involvement in the Agent Orange Litigation, in which he medi-
ated the settlement and then administered the distribution of the
Fund.139 If the Fund is seen as a large alternative dispute resolution
mechanism, Feinberg's arguments, promises, and cajoling break no
new ground, even if they reflect an approach that is not free of
controversy.
With respect to the decisionmaking process itself, Feinberg has
adopted a model that owes much to arbitration practices.1 40 Under
135. See David W. Chen, A Slow, Deliberate Process of Weighing 9/11 Awards, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2003, at BI.
136. Varchaver, supra note 121. Feinberg has described his view of the office of special
master: "You're only 10 percent lawyer. You're 40 percent Rabbi and 50 percent shrink." See
Josh Tyrangiel, Holding the Checkbook, TIME, Sept. 11, 2002, at 62.
137. In discussing his conception of mediation, Feinberg has described himself as "an assertive
mediator" whose job is to be "the voice of brutal honesty" that shakes parties from their fixed
positions. See Varcharver, supra note 121.
138. Feinberg has been explicit that he measures the success of the Fund in terms of how
many families file claims, as opposed to commencing litigation. See Olin, supra note 131, at 2
(quoting statement by Feinberg that "if you really want to gauge the success of this thing, it
resides in the fact that only ten suits have been brought to this point, and a couple of filers are
trying to get back into my program").
139. See SCHUCK, supra note 23.
140. See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ADVOCATE'S PERSPEcTIVE, CASES AND MATERIALS 315-18 (2001) (describing characteristics of
arbitration).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:719
the regulations, hearings are private and informal.1 41 No record need
be maintained. Because most of the regulatory standards governing
the Fund are presumptive, there are few legal rules to apply. The de-
termination takes the form of an award amount with no written expla-
nation or decision.1 42 Awards do not create binding precedent and are
completely unreviewable. t43 If Fund claimants are viewed as having
opted out of the tort system and into a large Alternative Dispute Res-
olution (ADR) scheme, the use of an arbitration model would make
sense.
Viewing the Fund as a government benefit program, however, casts
Feinberg's approach in a different light. When the Fund is viewed as a
benefit program that confers entitlements on a particular class of indi-
viduals, Feinberg's approach appears more troubling in a number of
respects. As the adjudicator of a government program, Feinberg is
charged with the task of making governmental determinations con-
cerning the rights of claimants. Regardless of whether the formal pro-
visions of the APA apply, the task carries with it expectations of
impartiality and neutrality that traditionally signal a need for detach-
ment rather than engagement. At root, there are different norms that
govern the conduct of mediators versus those who perform quasi-judi-
cial roles.1 44
141. The regulations allow claimants a choice between two procedural tracks. Under track A.
a claims examiner issues a determination based on a paper record that is appealable to the
special master or his designee. See 29 C.F.R. § 104.31(b) (2002). On appeal, the claimant may
present evidence at a hearing that the claims examiner erred or that special circumstances war-
rant a departure from the presumed award amounts. Id. § 104.33. Under track B, the claim
proceeds directly to a hearing before the Special Master or his designee. Id. § 104.31(b)(2). The
determination is not appealable. Id.
142. See id. § 104.33(g) ("The Special Master shall notify the claimant in writing of the final
amount of the award, but need not create or provide any written record of the deliberations that
resulted in that determination."). Apparently, Feinberg does provide some form of oral expla-
nation to claimants. Conversation with Justin Green, Kreindler & Kreindler (Apr. 2, 2003).
143. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.33(g) ("There shall be no further review or appeal of the Special
Master's determination."); 104.34 (reserving the right to publish selected awards as "general
guides" that should not be "viewed as precedent binding on the Special Master or his staff").
144. Feinberg's conflation of the role of mediator and adjudicator appears to owe a heavy
debt to his mentor Judge Jack Weinstein, whose active role in mass tort litigation has drawn both
criticism and praise. See SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 265-66 (critiquing the active role of Judge
Weinstein in the Agent Orange case); Minow, supra note 62, at 2010 (describing and assessing
Judge Weinstein's conception of the judge as the "problem-solver to the entire situation"); David
Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064 (1997) (commenting on
Minow); Mullenix, supra note 62 (rejecting Judge Weinstein's approach as calling for judges to
be "biased, feeling, involved, opinionated and result oriented").
Indeed, Feinberg has written sympathetically about Judge Weinstein's vision of a "communi-
tarian ethic" in lawyering and judging-the idea that resolutions of mass tort litigation "must
take into account broader public policy considerations tied to the social, economic and political
needs of the community at large." See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Lawyering in Mass Torts, 97
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Viewed through this lens, Feinberg's outspoken qualities pose a risk
of creating the appearance of prejudgment. Feinberg's public state-
ments reveal him to be an individual brimming with strong opinions
and value judgments about the very matters he is called upon to adju-
dicate. Moreover, they display a great personal stake in how the Fund
is perceived by victims and the public. When claimants are disap-
pointed by their awards, as some undoubtedly will be, blame will inev-
itably fall on Feinberg because it is difficult to conceive of the
decisions as anything other than an expression of his personal values
and judgments. By personalizing the program, Feinberg has left little
room for claimants to conclude that a decisionmaker has made a fair
attempt to apply preexisting standards to their cases. Instead, each
decision is likely to appear ad hoc and arbitrary, rather than the prod-
uct of a system of law. 145 This danger is exacerbated by Feinberg's
public statements urging claimants to file with the Fund. These state-
ments will be construed as implicit promises that they will be happy
with the result. Thus, in addition to the other problems, disappointed
claimants may also feel misled. t 46
Feinberg's actions serving to personalize the Fund, therefore, have
an ironic quality. Presumably, the tables were intended to establish a
COLUM. L. REv. 2177 (1997). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 23 (articulating "communitarian"
ethic).
In one major respect, Feinberg's conduct is less troubling than the conduct of Judge Weinstein.
Feinberg has been granted administrative authority by Congress, while Judge Weinstein has re-
lied solely on powers conferred through Article III.
In some ways, however, Feinberg's approach appears more problematic, as he is free of some
important constraints that have limited Judge Weinstein. First, unlike Judge Weinstein in Agent
Orange, Feinberg's views about how to structure the Fund need not be accepted by parties
through their consent to a settlement. Second, Feinberg's decisions on award amounts are com-
pletely insulated from judicial review, whereas Judge Weinstein operated against the backdrop
of an appellate process. Even though Judge Weinstein possessed an abundance of means to
extract consent and evade appellate review, these constraints served as some kind of check on
his authority.
145. The Schneider decision makes this problem apparent. Plaintiffs submitted affidavits
describing conversations with Feinberg in which he told one claimant that despite economic
analysis showing losses between 14 and 15 million, the numbers were "far north of anything" he
would award and that he would not give more than 6 million to any claimant. Schneider v.
Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 141 (2nd Cir. 2003). The affidavits state that Feinberg told other claim-
ants informally that he would award up to $7 million. Id. The Second Circuit viewed the incon-
sistencies as evidence that Feinberg is not using a fixed cap, rather than an indication that there
is a cap but that it shifts from case to case based on unknown variables. Id. at 144.
146. When he is viewed as a disinterested adjudicator, Feinberg's success, measured by the
number of claims as opposed to lawsuits filed, appears singularly inappropriate. The correct
question is whether the Fund is providing the compensation to which claimants are entitled
under law. Since the alternative of litigation is fairly dismal, Feinberg's formulation of his objec-
tive sets a low threshold for himself. While a mediator may be content with structuring the Fund
so that victims find it marginally superior to litigation, a government adjudicator should seek
simply to provide the benefits that claimants are due.
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uniform set of principles that would furnish a coherent rationale for
awards. The explanatory material that Feinberg has issued provides a
reasoned basis for the judgments made in constructing the tables.
Feinberg's repeated statements inviting claimants to make individual-
ized showings and his disavowals that the tables represent real caps
shift the focus away from the tables and back toward his unfettered
and undefined discretion.
There is a strong argument that Feinberg's statements violate no
formal standard of conduct. Although courts have required adminis-
trative officials engaged in adjudication to remain circumspect, offi-
cials engaged in rulemaking are not required to hold their tongues.' 47
As is common in administrative government, Feinberg has the power
to act in both capacities. Because his statements concern the Fund
generally, rather than particular awards to particular claimants, it is
likely that they would ordinarily fall on the more lenient rulemaking
side of this dichotomy.148 Nonetheless, because the rulemaking deals
exclusively with how he will personally adjudicate claims, the argu-
ments for circumspection that arise from the adjudicative context have
considerable force.
Feinberg's decision not to provide written explanations of awards
also undermines confidence in the fairness of the process. At first
glance, it may appear that a written explanation of the award is unnec-
essary because awards are not subject to judicial review.' 49 As the
United States Supreme Court recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, 150 how-
ever, the obligation of an administrative adjudicator to provide rea-
sons for his determination is a critical form of accountability that
serves to ensure that decisions rest on applicable legal rules and on
147. Compare Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(ordering recusal of FTC chairman from adjudicatory proceeding based on public statements
which could be construed as indicating prejudgment), with Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools inapplicable in the
rulemaking context).
Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct cautions judges against public comment on the
merits of a pending case. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (1980); See In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 164-167 (1st
Cir. 2001) (ordering recusal of trial judge who told reporter that a pending case was "more
complex" than a previous one); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 992-96 (10th Cir. 1993)
(ordering recusal of judge who explained his decision on "Nightline").
148. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976)
(holding decisionmaker not "disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public
... on a policy issue related to the dispute").
149. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Contemporaneous
explanation of administrative decisions is necessary to permit judicial review.).
150. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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the evidence in the record. 15' The obligation to articulate a reasoned
basis for determinations is one means of ensuring that decisions are in
fact the product of reasoned analysis. Rather than making a written
decision superfluous, the absence of judicial review heightens the im-
portance of reasoned explanation because it is one of the only forms
of accountability remaining. Feinberg's failure to explain his awards
may well violate due process.
Feinberg's refusal to provide claimants with expert reports, pre-
pared by his office as part of the claims evaluations process, is simi-
larly troubling. In making determinations, Feinberg relies on
economic analyses of each case performed by the accounting firm of
PriceWaterhouse Coopers. 152 The reports, however, are not turned
over to claimants, who are thereby denied access to critical informa-
tion concerning the disposition of their claims.1 53
The omission of written decisions and the other aspects of procedu-
ral informality, such as the absence of a hearing record, is presumably
based on an analogy to arbitration. The legitimacy of arbitration pro-
cedures hinges on the idea of consent-the notion that parties may
opt out of the formal elements of due process.154 As noted above, it is
possible to view the Fund claimants as making such a choice by filing
with the Fund rather than pursuing litigation. This view of the Special
Master's function, however, is unsatisfying. All claimants for govern-
ment benefits choose to apply for benefits. The decision to apply does
not reflect any kind of waiver of due process rights even if the absence
of procedure is apparent from the start. Similarly, claimants to the
Fund have no choice but to apply in order to receive Fund benefits.
The Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected the idea that applicants
for benefits must "accept the bitter with the sweet," meaning that
Congress cannot condition the provision of substantive benefits on the
waiver of procedural rights. 155 The view that procedural protections
151. Id. at 271.
152. See Letter from Andrew Schilling, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Mar. 18, 2003), submitted to
the court in Colaio v. Feinberg, 03 Civ. 0558 (AKH) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7626 (S.D.N.Y. filed
May 8, 2003). See also Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Rule 56 Motions for
Summary Judgment, Smith v. Ashcroft. No. 03 CV 1040 (AKH) at *5-6 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7626 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 3, 2003) (describing Feinberg's refusal to turn over a PriceWaterhouse
analysis of economic loss prepared in connection with a claim).
153. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 ("Evidence used to prove the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that [it] is untrue.") (quoting
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)).
154. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("the arbitrability of
the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute .... ").
155. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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can be dispensed with in the administration of the Fund because it is
some kind of ADR mechanism rests on a conflation of substance and
procedure that ignores the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Feinberg's conception of his role as that of a mediator and arbitra-
tor has had repercussions for the legal representation of claimants.
The Fund was originally described as an informal mechanism for cut-
ting checks to victims within 120 days of application. The image of the
process as a simple vehicle for dispensing funds was probably unrealis-
tic to begin with-the amounts are simply too large to be doled out in
a cavalier manner. The explanations issued by Feinberg supporting
the tables reveal the large amount of technical data that must be con-
sidered in measuring economic loss and the many judgment calls
about which data to use and how to use it. It is inevitable that most
claimants facing such a process will choose to proceed through coun-
sel. To its credit, the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA)
stepped up and offered pro bono representation to Fund claimants. To
date, approximately 1,500 victims have accepted this offer. Trial Law-
yers Care (TLC), an offshoot of ATLA, coordinates the provided
representation.15 6
But the spotlight on Feinberg himself has further complicated the
process. The uncertainty about how he will actually decide claims, to-
gether with his volubility, has created a market for counsel beyond
what would otherwise have been the case. Many claimants have de-
cided to forego pro bono representation, choosing instead, to pay
large sums for counsel, typically contingency fees of ten to fifteen per-
cent. 157 Perhaps, there is nothing wrong with this development, but it
is at least in part a by-product of the procedural regime that the Spe-
cial Master has established.
Feinberg's conduct has contributed to this result by creating a mar-
ket for expertise in the operation of the Fund, and in essence, a mar-
ket for knowledge of Feinberg. Lawyers who handle a large volume
of claims before the Fund have decided advantages over those who
only handle one or two such claims. Because only very basic informa-
tion about awards are published by the Special Master, lawyers with
large inventories of claims can detect patterns in awards that lawyers
156. See Kasindorf & Jelveh, supra note 127. Approximately 1,200 lawyers are participating in
the effort. Id.
157. See David W. Chen, Saying No to Free 9/11 Aid, Many Families Hire Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2002, at B1; Diana B. Henriques, Legal Representation and a 10 Percent Fee, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at B8; O'Brien, supra note 116. Two firms specializing in aviation law,
Baumeister & Samuels and Kriendler & Kriendler, have taken the lead in signing up clients on a
contingency fee basis. Kriendler & Kriendler represents over 270 clients in connection with
claims before the Fund. See Laurence, supra note 110.
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with only one or two claims handled pro bono could not possibly un-
cover. Feinberg's accessibility and willingness to answer questions
about the Fund in public adds to the problem by creating the impres-
sion that lawyers who attend as many of the Special Master's public
appearances as possible will be better prepared to navigate the pro-
cess. Because Feinberg does not flinch from predicting how he would
resolve hypotheticals posed to him in public, his appearances are an
important source of information that is provided in. a relatively hap-
hazard manner. Again, this places firms handling large numbers of
claims at an advantage because they can cover more events and thus
collect more information. The system, thus, places pro bono counsel
who handle only one or two cases at a disadvantage.' 58
Finally, lawyers with personal relationships with Feinberg can trade
on their connections. Variations on this practice range from state-
ments by lawyers intimating that they meet regularly with Feinberg to
discuss the Fund, or that they have known Feinberg for many years, or
even that Feinberg asked them to handle claims before the Fund. 159
The implication of these statements is that claimants who retain law-
yers who are known to and respected by Feinberg are likely to fare
better than others. Given the absence of any governing laws or rules
of decision, and the lack of judicial review, the concentration of power
in a single individual may make inevitable this kind of marketing.
In general, the two different groups of counsel, pro bono and non
pro bono, appear to have very different views of Feinberg and the
Fund. The spokesmen for TLC have been effusive in their praise.
Larry Stewart, the president of TLC, hailed early awards issued by
Feinberg, stating that "these awards fulfill the commitment of the
[S]pecial [M]aster to consider the individual facts of each case . . . I
feel confident now that the victims compensation fund is going to
work.' 160 He concluded that Feinberg is "prompt, compassionate and
fair. ' 161 In contrast, many of the lawyers representing claimants on a
paying basis have been scathingly critical. James Kreindler termed
Feinberg's regulations "insulting" and "absurd."t62 Michel
Baumeister commented that "the regulations are a betrayal to the
158. TLC has sought to correct these imbalances through an impressive effort to provide
training and disseminate information to its network of pro bono attorneys. See generally Trial
Lawyers Care, at http://91 llawhelp.org/info/lawyers/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (TLC website for
lawyers representing clients before the Fund).
159. A number of claimants have reported these and similar statements to the author.
160. See Austin Fenner, Widow Takes Feds 9/11 Awards, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2602, at 23.
161. See Kasindorf & Jelveh, supra note 127. Special Master Feinberg, in turn, has referred to
the pro bono counsel as "heroes." See Laurence, supra note 110.
162. See O'Brien, supra note 116.
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families who have suffered enormously as a result of the tragic events
of September 11th. ' 163
It is possible that this split in opinion on the Fund among counsel is
simply coincidental-individual lawyers with strong views will fre-
quently differ. But it is also possible that other factors are at work
that render the division unsurprising. In the days after September
11th, ATLA urged a moratorium on litigation arising out of the disas-
ter and lobbied for the creation of the Fund.164 Its offer of free legal
representation for claimants was featured in the congressional debate
that led to enactment of the Transportation Safety Act. 165 Thus,
ATLA has an interest in the success of the Fund that it helped to
create. Moreover, TLC's supportive statements suggest that it ap-
proaches the Fund as a cooperative enterprise in which its lawyers
help clients navigate an administrative process. Under this view, the
Fund is not comparable to tort litigation, and counsel do not view
their role as participants in an adversarial proceeding. 166
In contrast, counsel who charge a fee for representing claimants
have tended to use a more hard-edged adversarial style in dealing with
the Fund. They have approached the task of representing clients
before the Fund as a form of tort litigation, touting expertise in avia-
tion law as an important asset.1 67 These attorneys have tended to
raise vociferous objections to the ways in which Feinberg's implemen-
tation of the Fund departs from a tort-based model of compensation.
Moreover, their own compensation arrangements, largely based on
contingency fees, clearly spring from a conception of a Fund claim as
analogous to a tort claim.168 Because Feinberg sees his role as con-
163. Comment of Michel F. Baumeister (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/
victimcompensation/interim/njan31NO02505.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
164. See Bob Van Voris, A Commitment to Victims of Attacks, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A14.
165. See 147 CONG. REc. H5913 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt
attaching text of letter from president of ATLA). ATLA may well have been concerned about
adverse publicity that would have resulted if an avalanche of personal injury cases were filed
after September l1th. See Van Voris, supra note 163 (noting that ATLA's actions avoided nega-
tive publicity against lawyers).
166. This description is not meant to disparage the zealousness of representation provided
through TLC. Plainly, many lawyers provide superb representation in facilitative settings. In
any event, it is not clear how far TLC's conception of the Fund affects individual representation,
because individual attorneys bring their own judgment to bear in representing clients.
167. See O'Brien, supra note 116, at 1 (quoting one attorney as explaining that "many families
want to go to an aviation expert and in complex cases will need one").
168. The percentage rates are, however, significantly lower than these firms would charge for
litigation work. Nonetheless, under a 10% contingency arrangement, fees are likely to average
over $100,000 per case. Firms that can enjoy economies of scale by doing a large volume of
claims stand to do very well indeed.
The Special Master's regulations are silent on the issue of attorneys fees, but the preamble
states that "The Department believes that contingency arrangements exceeding 5% of a claim-
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vincing claimants to file with the Fund, these attorneys could be seen
as using the threat of litigation to strike the best deal for their clients.
The aviation firms are clearly capable of going the litigation route in a
way that TLC is not. 169 Additionally, an adversarial stance bolsters
their contentions that legal work on claims is neither easy nor routine,
and thus calls for lawyers with special expertise. If representation
before the Fund appeared principally as a matter of filling out paper
work, there would be little reason for clients to forego offers of pro
bono assistance in order to retain the experts in the field.
It may be that money spent by claimants to retain firms such as
Kreindler & Kreindler and Baumeister & Samuels is money well
spent. It is also possible, however, that their clients will fare no better
than those represented by pro bono counsel. 170 The swirl of legal ac-
tivity around the Fund, however, is in itself significant. First, it reflects
the fact that in personalizing the Fund, Feinberg has created a situa-
tion in which knowledge of Feinberg and his countless public and pri-
vate statements about the Fund is a marketable form of legal
expertise. Second, the disparity in approaches of TLC and the fee-
charging aviation firms stems, at least in part, from the underlying dif-
ficulties in conceptualizing the Fund. Lawyers who view it as a feature
of the tort system are not only likely to be unhappy with substantive
aspects of Feinberg's implementation, but are likely to view the Fund
through an adversarial lens. Lawyers who view the Fund as a govern-
ment benefit program are much more likely to view their role as
facilitative as they help to process cases through the system and
achieve outcomes that are favorable to their clients.
ant's recovery from the Fund would not be in the best interests of claimants." September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,280 (Dec. 21, 2001).
In the administrative context, contingency fees have been used for representation of claimants
for Social Security benefits. The Social Security Administration has capped fees at 25% or
$4,000, whichever is lower. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (2000). In contrast with the Victims Compen-
sation Fund, fee arrangements in Social Security cases are closely regulated and require adminis-
trative approval. See generally Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002) (discussing
contingency fees in the Social Security context). Moreover, Social Security proceedings gener-
ally occur in a context in which the attorney takes a substantial risk in entering into a contin-
gency fee arrangement because a loss would result in no payment. The principal issue in
representing clients before the Fund, however, concerns the amount of an award, rather than
whether any award will be paid.
169. TLC will refer out clients who choose to sue rather than file with the Fund. See Dan
Haar, No Fee: Lawyers Pitch In To Aid Families; Terror in America: The Nation Fights Back,
HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 11, 2001, at 23.
170. Of course, all pro bono counsel and all fee-based counsel cannot be lumped together.
Given the large numbers of lawyers involved, it is inevitable that there will be a large range in




The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is unique
in the extent to which it uses tort principles to make distributive
choices in a government benefit program. The Fund is also unique in
its lack of a funding mechanism which serves to justify the use of pri-
vate law distributional principles. Awards cannot be rationalized as a
form of insurance or as a return on contributions. Thus, it is abun-
dantly clear that every dollar paid by the Fund comes from public
coffers. The use of a private law remedial scheme in the absence of
such a funding mechanism places a strain on many notions of fairness
that are traditionally implicated in the design of public benefits pro-
grams, such as the values of parity, administrative efficiency, and most
importantly, payment based on need.
The fact that the Fund is beset by conflicting policies should not be
construed as a condemnation. Almost all public policies that deal
with complex problems represent compromises between competing
objectives. The question, therefore, is whether the substantive poli-
cies and procedural mechanisms reflected in the Fund come to terms
with these conflicts in a manner that tends to diffuse rather than exac-
erbate them. Feinberg has labored mightily to resolve the tensions
raised by the Fund, but he has been placed in a situation in which he
cannot possibly make everyone happy.
In the end, Feinberg has not succeeded in articulating standards and
principles that enable him to resolve the basic tensions in a principled
manner. The use of a presumptive award schedule on one level has
helped tremendously, but at the same time, it only begs the key ques-
tion of how the presumptions may be overcome. In the absence of
clear guiding principles on this point, the Fund awards appear solely
as the product of Feinberg's personal preferences. This appearance
results not simply from the absence of an articulated standard, but
also from the procedural regime that governs the Fund, particularly
the statutory preclusion of judicial review and the failure to provide
reasoned written determinations. It is also compounded by the man-
ner in which Feinberg projects himself as the personification of the
Fund, through countless public meetings, interviews, television ap-
pearances, and speeches about the Fund.
In addition, there is a disconnect between the way Feinberg talks
about the Fund and his attitude towards its administration. Feinberg
has repeatedly rejected comparisons between the Fund and the tort
system, emphasizing instead its social welfare aspects. Yet at the same
time, he conducts himself like a mediator in a mass tort litigation and
treats the Fund as a settlement fund. Feinberg's recognition that gov-
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ernment funding makes a difference in the substance of awards has
not fully carried over into his conception of procedural fairness. The
role of chief adjudicator of a multi-billion dollar government program
calls for a different model of procedural fairness than that which gov-
erns the conduct of a mediator. It calls for a recognition that awards
under the Fund are a matter of legal entitlement, rather than a
brokered deal or an expression of the Special Master's own prefer-
ences and that claimants have both a right to compensation and a
right to due process. Feinberg's conduct highlights the central weak-
ness of the Fund as an administrative mechanism-its operation rests
on the personal choices of a single individual, with little means of ac-
countability or oversight. As Feinberg has construed his grant of au-
thority, there are few governing legal standards, no real requirement
that like claims be treated alike, no obligation to provide reasoned
explanations, no limits on the amount that may be spent, and no
means of judicial review. It is difficult to conclude that the Fund con-
stitutes a responsible administrative mechanism for dispensing billions
in public funds however wise and solomonic Feinberg's judgments
may be. 171
At root, much of the blame must be placed at Congress's feet. The
establishment of an administrative scheme for compensation of vic-
tims of September 11th was not simply a good idea that meets the
needs of victims and the public as well-it was also the exact response
that so many have called for as a means of dealing with mass disas-
ter.1 72 The problem arises from the failure of Congress to articulate a
principled system of compensation that is appropriate for the circum-
stance. In some respects, this failure is not surprising. As Joel Han-
dler has pointed out, government benefit programs that implicate
deeply felt conflicting public values often shunt conflicts down the
chain of decision-makers, rather than resolving them at the outset.173
In this instance, Congress's failure is replicated in the regulatory
scheme which leaves key questions in an ambiguous haze to be
worked out on a case-by-case basis. Because the resolution in each
case occurs in a confidential proceeding that generates no written de-
cision and is not subject to review, it has no means of filtering back up
the system through a process of oversight or accountability. This cri-
171. Cf. Minow, supra note 62, at 2028 (noting that the judicial role "should be designed for
the ordinary, not the extraordinary person"); Luban, supra note 144, at 2089-90 (expressing con-
cern about whether the "heroic" model of judging is "risky and uncomfortable").
172. See, e.g., Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) (lamenting lack of congres-
sional response to the crisis in asbestos litigation).
173. See JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION
AND EMPOWERMENT (1996).
768 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:719
tique is not intended to obscure the fact that thousands of claimants
may walk away satisfied with their awards, and that this satisfaction
will stem from Feinberg's efforts. But for those who are not satisfied,
the Fund has few features that can legitimate its results. As an admin-
istrative system, this represents a significant shortcoming.
